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ABSTRACT
The Symptom: A Positive Perspective
(September 1981)
Jeffrey L. Lukens
,
B.A., Tufts College
M.A., University of Iowa, M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard Gadlin
The theory and practice of all psychotherapy is
influenced in the most basic ways by the meta- theoretical
underpinnings implicit in attitudes toward psychological
deviance and its manifestation in symptomology
. This dis-
sertation is built around a comparison of positive and
negative meta- theoretical perspectives in psychotherapy.
The positive and negative perspectives do not establish
another psychological theory. Rather, they form those
crucial meta-theoretical poles which determine the adequacy
of our theory to capture the essential human condition and
the potency of our practice to facilitate psychotherapeutic
change. The meta-theoretical notions that keep us at a
distance, that induce blockages in our ability to empathize
and get closer to the inner world of another, together with
the consequences for the psychotherapeutic process, consti-
tute the negative perspective.
V
Professional psychotherapists and society in general
reduce psychological symptomology to an excessively negative
and simplistic phenomenon. Language and theoretical con-
structs are permeated with these unexamined assumptions
which would diminish symptomatic man to lifeless', mechanical
object ification. TTieoretical dehumanization of the deviant
population evokes an attitude of distance and dominance.
Consequently we fail to hear the language of the symptom,
its artful reaching out in camouflaged symbology to estab-
lish that dialogue needed for psychological change.
There is another way of looking at psychological
symptomology which facilitates empathy and psychotherapy:
the positive perspective. This meta-theoretical perspective
is more than a tidy collection of ideas and techniques which
can be easily memorized and assimilated. The positive
perspective is always an achievement and requires continual
struggle. No one fully attains it or maintains it for very
long. Its temporary achievement is always resisted by
internal and external censors. These censorious forces
arise out of the peculiar nature of consciousness itself,
out of our need to distance from discomforting exposure to
madness, out of the needs of an embryonic psychology to
establish scientific legitimacy, and from societal pressures
to keep the mirror of madness from reflecting our failures.
vi
The positive and negative perspectives are elusive.
To heighten awareness of them the philosophical premises are
delimited and the broad meaning of symptomology is devel-
oped. Increasingly, this theme is concretized first by
situating it within general psychotherapeutic constructs in
a psychoanalytic base, then by tracing its history within
mainstream psychoanalytic thought, and finally by exemplify-
ing its reality and importance in psychotherapy, supervision
and consulting. The psychoanalytic tradition has been
chosen because of its seminal influence and current hegemony
in the theory and practice of working with the psychologi-
cally deviant population. Within this tradition, the
positive perspective has had a long and erratic course
beginning with the truly radical and courageous break-
throughs of Freud.
Beginning in 1893 and ending with a loss of nerve in
1920, Freud almost single-handedly articulated the essential
theoretical and practical qualities of the positive perspec-
tive. However, these qualities were never cohesively
presented and are found scattered in isolated segments of
his writings. Many of the major theorists/psychotherapists
who followed extended one or more aspects of the positive
perspective on symptomology, although the lineage is clear-
est in the object relational, self psychology pioneers.
Those who worked with children and psychotics especially
VIL
learned the most about the positive perspective orientation,
The attempt to understand the insistent but often incompre-
hensible ways of children and psychotics has also provided
the experiential ground out of which this work has grown.
Their message can facilitate psychotherapy, supervision and
consultation with all symptomatic populations.
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INTRODUCTION
The way all of us look at psychological deviance and
at its hopeful remedy in psychotherapeutic change is pro-
foundly limited. We are caught up in a perspective which is
inadequate, which overly simplifies, and which dulls our
ability to understand madness and its communicative expres-
sion in symptomology. This dominant perspective insidiously
colors our perceptions, our theory, and our mode of relating
to those considered symptomatic. My intent is to unveil and
delimit this covert perspective and to bring into focus
another way of seeing.
There is a secretive, forbidden quality enshrouding
this unpopular other way of seeing. I have always felt it
necessary to keep this perspective to myself and even from
myself. It is an uncomfortable way of seeing which demands
a continually renewed willingness to live with discomfort.
My method in what follows is to alternate from one perspec-
tive to the other, teasing out the theoretical parameters
and practical consequences of each, while speculating on the
sources of the discomfort. As I go along, my aim is to
increase awareness of another orientation to the symptom in
order to promote that healing dialogue needed by client and
therapist as well.
1
2This other way of seeing and the consequences for our
notions of change and psychotherapeutic technique comprise
the positive perspective. The positive perspective always
starts with the symptom. By symptom I mean something
broader in scope than simply those patterns of psychologi-
cally deviant thought and behavior classified in DSM-III
(Spitzer, 1980). I mean all forms of clinically significant
thought and behavior which may potentially alert trained
therapists or the lay public that something is wrong. This
may appear as transference, regression, hallucination, or an
anti-social act. Experientially for the therapist, the
positive perspective is always anchored in the therapist's
relationship to the manifestation of deviance, to the
symptom. As will be developed later, a symptom is a complex
phenomenon. It is more than simply the apparent sign of
pathology or deviance, although this is part of it. "It is
also an effort to communicate, an effort to induce a certain
way of understanding and behaving in the environment, part
of which may be a psychotherapist. To intellectually
understand this is important, but to be able to sustain this
sort of understanding and demonstrate it in the experience
of being with another is extremely difficult and is of the
essence of what is meant by psychotherapeutic
. Further, as
psychotherapists we must continually return to immersion in
the dialogue with symptomatic communication as a check on
the correctness of our understanding and way of relating.
So the positive perspective must always start and end
with the symptom. The symptom affords a way in, a way to
facilitate our understanding of the other. This way of
seeing in itself has consequences for our understanding of
the therapeutic process. Although on the one hand I am
positing much more value in the symptom than it is generally
accorded, the focus of this paper is not on the nature of
symptoms per se. I am most interested in reopening the
dialogue between patients and therapists. It is the block-
ages in this dialogue, most of them out of our awareness and
derived from implicit assumptions and unconscious attitudes
toward the other, which impede the psychotherapeutic pro-
cess. Clients want to change and seek those necessary
environmental provisions which will allow them to do so.
The scope of this paper, while expanding the notion of
symptoms, will be limited to looking at those consequences
of our implicit meta- theories which have practical bearing
on achievement of the positive perspective, on that dialogue
needed for change to occur
.
The positive perspective is a broad and inclusive
notion which, while being extremely abstract, is also
extremely real. Its reality can be experienced and its
consequences are of the utmost importance for the process of
4psychotherapy. But the positive perspective does not exist
as an independent entity the way a shoe does, for example.
I claim no transcendent, ontological status for it. It can
never be known in itself but only in contrast to the other
way of seeing, to the negative perspective. It can only be
known in our daily struggle with relating to ourselves and
to others. The negative and positive perspectives do not
constitute another psychological theory, such as Behavior-
ism. Rather, they form the meta- theoretical poles of the
implicit assumptions governing our attitudes to ourselves
and others
.
The positive and negative perspectives form the
defining poles along the dimension of obj ectification. To
the extent we don't separate ourselves from all that is
human, vital, and subjectively meaningful we are in the
realm of the positive perspective. To the extent that we
treat ourselves or the other as inanimate, as off the
continuum with our inner self, as an object with little
meaningfulness in itself, we are closer to the negative
perspective. We all tend to vascillate between these two
poles and no one achieves the positive perspective for very
long. We might treat our dearest loved ones, for example,
with the respect and empathy characteristic of the positive
perspective. We might also, out of our fear of madness or
out of the expediency a job might provoke, treat mental
5patients as objects, as examples of pathology wholly differ-
ent from ourselves, as requiring no more thought than it
takes to medicate or to warehouse.
No one theory, or school of thought, or group of
people has a monopoly on either of these perspectives.
However, the relatively asymptomatic population always tends
to objectify those labeled as mentally deviant or symptom-
atic. At least in the world of psychotherapy, especially in
its theory, the negative perspective always tends to be
dominant and in the majority and its consensual power makes
the individual expression of the positive perspective seem
radical. This is what I mean by the secret nature of this
other way of seeing, of the positive perspective. My growth
as a therapist has demanded that I find the courage to
achieve greater clarity about the reality and character of
this perspective which needs to express itself in subtle and
camouflaged forms in symptomatic communication.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in any
depth the origins of the censorious forces which make the
positive perspective such a difficult achievement. At first
glimpse, it appears that society has developed a consensual
contract which operates out of our awareness but into which
we all readily buy. It is as though we have collectively
conspired to legitimize turning into inconsequential objects
those people who threaten our sense of stability, our sense
6of power and effectance, who would dare confront us with the
thinness and vulnerability of our comfortable sanity, or who
would remind us of the failures and cost of our society. Or
perhaps, as does Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1956), we
must look within ourselves to the very nature of conscious-
ness for this negation of the other and of ourselves which
is the essence of obj ectification.
Sartre (1956) claims that negation arises logically
and experientially in the same moment as our awareness of
beingness. Awareness of our beingness-in-itself immediately
confronts us with the dreadful awareness of non-being. To
enjoy the fruits of that delicious sense of being fully
alive is to live in the shadow of non-being, of death, of
obj ectification. It takes great courage to sustain the
intensity of awareness of beingness and of the concomitant
sense of non-being. Consequently we project that negation
onto others, or we deaden ourselves and the world around us
by detaching from this awareness. Further, to be aware of
our beingness is to apprehend that this possibility that is
myself is only one of many possibilities. Being confronted
with the recognition of my inherent freedom in choosing one
of all these possibilities, and my awareness that I bet my
life on the possibility I choose, is cause for great
anxiety. Thus we tend to distract ourselves from this
awareness, we negate ourselves, we lie to ourselves, we
7indulge in "bad faith." This attitude of negation and
denial mitigates the beingness of others for ourself and of
ourself for others as we have negated ourselves. Therefore
others are negated as well. Sartre would assert that given
our tendency to hide in bad faith we all tend to objectify
not just mental patients but everyone, including ourselves.
Whatever the source or sources of this obj ectification
of our clients and their symptoms, this phenomenon is
prevalent and impedes our ability to facilitate psycho-
therapeutic change. I cannot imagine a world without the
continual dialectical play of obj ectification mixed with
moments of compassion, empathy, and understanding. My
position in this respect is more aligned with Foucault
(1961/1973) than with Laing (1960, 1961, 1967) in that I am
not advocating the overthrow of the consensual way of seeing
and I don't view myself and mental deviance as being inde-
pendent of, and superior to our social context. To Foucault
I would add that none of us is independent of our mental
context, of the nature of consciousness. The purpose of
this paper, of explicating ramifications of the positive
perspective, is to try to temporarily achieve a glimpse of
both sides of that tension that exists between our often
misguided efforts to understand our clients and our clients'
efforts to communicate their reality to us. This tension is
further situated within the client's artful production of a
8symptom. In the course of this journey, I hope to sketch
out some of the basic parameters of the positive and nega-
tive perspectives as they have existed in the psychoanalytic
literature since the time of Freud and point out their
consequences for therapy. Before I do that, it might prove
helpful if I offer a concrete sense of my theme by relating
two formative incidents which helped make me aware that
there was the possibility of another way of seeing.
One of the first notable incidents took place while I
was working for Dr. John Rosen as a live-in head of a house
of psychotic patients at Twin Silos, a retreat geared to the
therapy of refractory psychotics. No drugs of any sort were
used, not even aspirin. One day I was sitting by myself,
reading, when David (name changed), a chronically psychotic
paranoid schizophrenic of forty-two, walked by. My rela-
tionship (if you can call it that) with David had always
been extremely strained as he was totally uncooperative in
any of the duties we all were to share in the upkeep of the
house. David acted like a prima donna, was capable of great
anger when pushed to do something, and our interactions were
nothing but power struggles. I always felt that this is how
it had to be as David was generally regarded as having
reached his optimum level of functioning because of his past
history with "maintenance shock." David had received ECT
every day for approximately two years. He now could dress
and care for himself, but no one thought him capable of much
meaningful interaction.
David was prone to talking to inanimate objects and on
this occasion he said something to the lamp I was using to
read by. As he walked back and forth I sensed him craftily
looking my way but then quickly acting preoccupied when I
looked up. I felt in a playful mood and decided to play
with his symptomatic behavior. I began to talk earnestly to
the lamp as well. To make a long story short, David and I
struck up a relationship initially based on great indirect-
ness of communication, indirect in manner as well as in
content. Eventually, David even became helpful with the
household chores. To my astonishment, I discovered that
David had been communicating all along but I had failed to
adapt to his way of doing it. Further, there was something
frightening for me about letting go of my accustomed ways of
doing things. David's communication, far from being impov-
erished and meaningless, was rich in meaning, too rich for
me to handle most of the time. He was highly attuned to the
slightest whisper of interpersonal communication: a tone of
voice, a look, a gesture. It was very unsettling to be with
someone who remained in a state of hyper-awareness and who
perceived things about myself and others which would pass
without notice in the as3miptomatic world.
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A second influential incident took place several years
later when I was engaged in a practicum at the outpatient
unit of a Veterans Administration Mental Hospital. One of
the senior staff psychiatrists who was much respected for
his long experience, the books he had written, and espe-
cially for his superciUious ways, referred a patient to me.
I was told, in essence, that I was being afforded the chance
to further my education by getting to see a dyed-in-the-wool
specimen of paranoid thinking. At our staff meeting I was
further told that this man's acute disorder indicated very
severe pathology. The only sensible course of action was
medication and clearly therapy would be a waste of time as
his prognosis was so poor. They decided that for the sake
of an educational experience, however, it would do no harm
for me to see him once per week on an hourly basis.
I began to see this man, let's call him Tom. True to
his diagnosis, Tom related with great intensity his feeling
that his wife, his co-workers in construction, and his
friends were all acting aggressively toward him. I was
intrigued by this uneducated man, by his survival ability in
the face of a disasterous home situation as a child. He had
worked his way out of poverty, abuse and neglect and was on
the verge of making it as the construction boss. He had a
home, a wife, and two children and was evidently skilled in
his trade. Despite his limited vocabulary, in his
11
descriptions and telling of his story there was a kind of
simple eloquence which class bias could easily obscure. I
decided to listen carefully to Tom, not just to signs of his
paranoia but to the content and context of what he was
saying. I began to understand Tom's world a little and I
began to understand that Tom, like David, wasn't just
delusional and "decathected" from the real world. His
symptoms contained his whole story and spoke forcefully of
his attempts to work out past traumas and detours in his
self. Tom also had been pushed into a state of hyper-
sensitivity and awareness of his environment as became clear
in his perceptions of me and of the staff. As I became able
to appreciate his reality, the symbolic themes of his
symptoms led to an understanding of how his past was being
lived out in the present. Tom had, unawares, selected
aspects of his current world, which few could see but were
real nevertheless, to concretize traumatic interpersonal
themes from the past. Some of this had been precipitated by
his great guilt over impending success as a boss and over
the unfaithfulness of his desire for women other than his
wife. Tom came to some reconciliation with his past and
with his great fear of loss of the internalized good, but
weak object, his mother. Tom went back to work and got the
job as boss.
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The common denominator of these incidents was my
recognition that there was a person behind and in the
symptoms. I didn't start off with that idea and I am not
sure what led me to listen in a different way. Perhaps it
was the challenge provoked by those particular settings.
Whatever the reasons, I was intrigued with my observations
that the mental health deliverers seemed too distant,
separated, and preoccupied with their theory and were deaf
and blind to the communication of their clients. The
therapists, institutional staff, and the lay public seemed
to cling tenaciously to an implicit assumption that madness
was qualitatively different from normality. There was an
attitude of superiority toward those who were more symptoma-
tic. This very attitude precluded communication and impeded
any possibility of establishing a therapeutic environment.
It seemed to me that our clients were always motivated for
change but that our distant, unresponsive attitude consis-
tently undermined their attempts to establish that environ-
ment they required. This is the crux of the problem. The
theoretical and practical aspects of the positive perspec-
tive are intended to mitigate the unseen but forceful tug of
the negative perspective.
In order to get a handle on these slippery, implicit
assumptions which determine our attitude and practice I have
arbitrarily separated theory from practice. The practice
13
had to come first in order for me to see the reality of
these perspectives. But in this paper the theory comes
first (the first three chapters). Szasz (1961). Laing
(I960, 1961, 1967), Foucault (1954/1976. 1961/1973) and
Sedgwick (1971) address some of the philosophical issues and
the sociological determinants which help to define my two
perspectives. My emphasis in the theoretical sections is
quite different. I find that within the non-critical
literature itself these perspectives have a tradition and
development beginning with Freud which have not been suffi-
ciently recognized. The scope of this paper is to remain
within this tradition of the psychoanalytic literature.
Once the parameters defining the contrast and tension of the
two perspectives are drawn out in Chapters I through III, I
will bring this theory and its implicatons for practice to
bear on the clinical activities of therapy, supervision, and
consultation in Chapter IV.
The chapters gradually develop the concept of the
positive perspective. The way our implicit assumptions
about, and attitudes toward, symptomology influence our
notion of change and the psychotherapeutic process is the
central theme within which the positive perspective unfolds.
I start from the most general, abstract, and philosophical
demarcating in Chapter I and become more particular, con-
crete, and experiential as the theme is carried toward
14
over-
Chapter IV. Chapter I begins with the broadest of
views, with my language, meta- theoretical intent, and
definitions. Toward the end of the chapter, my notion of
the psychological symptom is set out by contrast with its
meaning and development within medicine by fixing its
historical lineage and by defining its unique, positive
perspective significance. Chapter II then separates the
negative from the positive perspective. Important qualities
of each are delineated, put in a psychoanalytic context, and
applied to the major, structural components defining psycho-
analytic psychotherapy.
In Chapter III, I move from more general theory to
situate the positive perspective in specific, personal
theories. I review the erratic course of the positive
perspective in major, representative theorists within the
psychoanalytic literature. Beginning with the initial and
most important theorist, Sigmund Freud, I pursue in some
detail his brilliant successes and understandable failures
in capturing the positive perspective from 1893 through
1920. Freud's struggles to achieve the positive perspective
serve to exemplify its major components, especially its
consequences for psychotherapeutic change, as well as the
inherent resistance it offers to those plummeting its
enigmatic, illusive nature. Each of the cited theorists
after Freud makes an important contribution and builds on
15
Freud's ground breaking innovations in theory and practice.
However, after Freud, I am drawn most of all to D. W.
Winnicott. He, like Freud, had the courage to allow enough
closeness with the other to empathically discern the per-
sonal meaning of his story while allowing room for the other
to come to be himself. Heinz Kohut is my last major theor-
ist. He brings the positive perspective into the current
era and into America. Many other significant contributors
to the positive perspective have been left unacknowledged.
These include Karen Homey, Margaret Mahler, Harry Stack
Sullivan, Carl Rogers, Frederick Perls, Erik Erikson,
Jacques Lacan, and Harold Searles, to name a few. All of
these are important. But those selected are just as repre-
sentative and influential and they especially furthered the
conjunction of theory and practice.
Chapter IV grounds the theory in personal experience
and practical application. First I discuss my own journey
in coming to understand the significance of the positive
perspective on symptomology
. Then I discuss and exemplify
the theme in the three principal settings in which I have
been engaged as a clinical psychologist: therapy, super-
vision, and consultation. Abstract meta-theory is seen as
more important, and more practical, than technique. The
progression of the chapters has been intended to allow the
crucial significance of the positive perspective to evolve.
16
It is primarily within these three settings that ray own
meta-theoretical conception of the positive perspective has
evolved. I hope, after all, to pass on my client's insist-
ence that their discomforting secret is real and worth
disentangling
.
CHAPTER I
THEORY AND BACKGROUND OF SYMPTOMS
.
. .
factors in our experience are clear and d^c:^;r^^^
and vaguely. (Whitehead, 1968? vi?) .
dimly
Theme
The history of psychoanalytic theory and practice up
through the present has been dominated by a one-sided,
negative perspective on psychologically deviant thought and
behavior, that is, on symptomology
. This negative perspec-
tive is a superordinate, meta-theoretical concept immanent
in the very language, constructs, and assumptions of classi-
cal and modern psychoanalytic thought. It permeates all of
the six metapsychological points of view (dynamic, topo-
graphic, economic, structural, genetic, adaptive) which are
said to comprise all of the ways of looking at psychological
phenomena. Consequently, the orientation of psychother-
apists and the lay public alike toward symptomology and
towards those who are S3miptomatic tends to be negative. By
negative I mean all those characteristics which reduce
people, their actions and thoughts, to impersonal, mechan-
istic constructs or objects. This reductionis tic view of
17
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se
our self-hood and its tormented expression in symptomology
is characterized by a preoccupation with the biological,
physicalistic, external world and a lack of recognition of
the internal, dynamic world. The negative perspective
psychology objectifies the activity and personhood of tho
who are identified as deviant and establishes a qualitative
gulf between "normality" and symptomatic conditions. This
built-in distance and filtered discernment of symptomology
in a broad sense precludes the growth of a more adequate
psychodynamic theory, of a more realistic sense of the
phenomenological experience of the other. For example, the
many layered complexity and rich, communicative nature of a
symptom becomes reduced to the simplistic, unbalanced view
that symptoms express only pathology. The implicit and
often not so implicit negative cast of our theory and
general outlook bears directly on how we conceive of change,
on our techniques in the psychotherapeutic process, and on
the overall treatment and care of the symptomatic popula-
tion.
S3miptoms, however, have a positive aspect. The entire
gamut of our thinking and behavior, and especially that
which is symptomatic or deviant, contains a positive compo-
nent which is developmental, dialogic, a present tense
striving for growth and mastery and an expression of a
creative core of selfhood. A symptom is the observable
19
communicative end product of both negative and positive
forces. It is a complex symbol of deficit and adaptational
compromise on the one hand, together with a camouflaged
rebelliousness positing reproach and a current striving for
development of the self on the other. The psychological
literature is remarkably devoid of a clear and explicit
account of this dual nature of symptomology and especially
of the positive part of the overall perspective. All forms
of symptomology, no matter whether fantasy, regression,
resistance, transference, or anti-social acts, have a posi-
tive developmental and object relational component. The
practice of psychotherapy, supervision, and consultation can
all be enriched and facilitated by the attempt to achieve
this neglected, positive perspective on symptomology.
Theoretical Orientation
The psychoanalytic framework is chosen as the basic
theoretical orientation for several reasons. Perhaps the
major reason is that the historical influence of psychoan-
alytic thinking currently influences the way we identify and
characterize a symptom. Much of this influence operates out
of our awareness. Further, the very historical and psychol-
ogical reasons which caused early psychoanalytic thinking to
lose sight of the positive aspect of symptoms continue to
exert their blinding influence. It is hoped that by
20
examining the vicissitudes of the positive perspective
within psychoanalytic theory we might come to a better
understanding of our current difficulties facilitating
psychotherapeutic change. Secondly, all other non-
behavioral systems of psychological thought are primarily
derived from, and make use of, psychoanalytic concepts.
Even the behavioral approach when utilized with humans in
real life situations in, for example, schools and half-way
houses, perceives the problematic symptom much as a non-
behaviorist would, no matter how quantified in form. What
often passes for behaviorism in the field is little more
than an attempt to provide security for the service provider
by mechanizing a relationship. This obj ectification of a
person and a relationship lies at the core of what is wrong
with some of the meta- theory of psychoanalytic thought.
Lastly, only the psychoanalytic framework provides the
depth, the dynamic theory, to adequately comprehend and
unify the apparent variety of symptoms to be found in the
many settings in which a clinical psychologist might work.
Within the overall context of a psychoanalytic ori-
entation, this paper will be limited to the object rela-
tional branch supported by the language of self psychology.
This specific theoretical orientation provides both frame-
work and content. The historical development and vicissi-
tudes of object relational self psychology parallel the
21
developments and fixations in the positive nature of symp-
tomology. The positive aspect of symptomology and its
practical use are most explicit in this approach.
Meta-Theory and Metapsychology
Unquestionably the basic assumptions, the meta-theory
of psychoanalytic thinking, influences all the rest of the
theorizing and practice in ways both subtle and obvious.
This might seem self-evident but this paper is precisely
about the profound consequences of an unexamined meta-theory
and of psychology's indifference and even hostility to
examining first principles.
The present day psychoanalytic negative perspective is
a consequence of insufficient attention to Freud's struggle
with some basic meta- theoretical issues. Freud's major
premises vacillated significantly. The fact that "Freud's
metapsychological writings are neither complete nor systema-
tic and are scattered throughout his writings" (Greenson,
1967, p. 20) has made detection difficult of one of these
major vacillations.
Prior to 1920, Freud was working toward the position,
though with great difficulty, that people have a fundamental
striving toward mastery and "restoration." This was mani-
fest in both the internal and external words in repetition.
For example, a psychotic 's hallucination repeats memories.
22
Freud attributes this repetition to the teleological specu-
lation that the mental replaying is an attempt at recovery,
an attempt to regain the lost object, an attempt "to restore
a libidinal cathexis to the ideas of objects" (1915/1957b)
.
This principle is seen in dreams, fantasy and hallucination,
play, humor, and in neurotic and psychotic symptoms.
Further, Freud makes the repetitive urge the essence of the
psychoanalytic concepts of transference and resistance.
This formulation represented a radical transformation of the
medical-psychological thought of the time. What appeared as
meaningless, pathological, and wholly negative was, for as
long as Freud could sustain this revolutionary perspective,
meaningful, a striving for health, and hopeful.
In 1920 (Beyond the Pleasure Principle ) Freud (1920/
1955) made a radical turnabout which altered the course of
all the psychoanalytic thinking to follow. What was posi-
tive now became negative. Repetition was still meaningful
but was reformulated as a principle of stasis and death.
There was a corresponding change in his view on symptom-
ology. The psychoanalytic community and the Western world
became entrapped in one aspect of symptomology
. This most
significant event largely passed without notice and still
remains in relative obscurity. Perhaps the boldness and
drama of Freud's 1920 paper was blinding. Perhaps the
paper filled a great need of the time for order and more
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simplistic unifying principles. Certainly Freud's abandon-
ment of a positive view of symptomology provided for psycho-
therapists and the lay public a reassuring distance from
madmen, from those who might provoke in us unsettling
questions about the nature of our sanity. In essence, this
was scapegoating wrought from the power of an unquestioned
meta-theoretical principle reified into psychoanalytic meta-
psychology.
Established (and establishment) psychoanalysts and
psychoanalytic societies have little interest in questioning
first principles. Elements of the neglected positive per-
spective on symptomology have been knocking on the door of
American psychoanalysis for decades but few have dared to
even greet the stranger. British school thinking (e.g.,
Fairbarin, Winnicott, Guntrip) and the French Lacanians have
found the courage to radically confront established doctrine
and pick up the threads of Freud's pre-1920 more truly
psychodynamic thinking. In so doing they have been gradual-
ly changing the meta-theoretical base and correcting the
long-standing theory and practice of an overly negative
perspective. However, much of this has been resisted by the
Americans as though it were a life and death struggle.
The major and representative American combatant is Roy
Schafer (1976, 1978) who wants to dispense with the danger
of a radically altered perspective (actually, only a more
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balanced perspective) by sounding the death knell for meta-
psychology. In a surprising reformulation. Schafer shed his
long history of influential texts on testing (Rappaport,
Gill & Schafer, 1968; Schafer, 1948, 1954, 1967). He even
abandoned his incisive, brilliant organization of the then
still radical, qualitative and structural ego psychology
approach (Schafer, 1968), radical despite Freud's construc-
tion of these principles almost twenty years before.
Schafer 's boldness and ability to critique metapsychological
issues had long been in evidence. But it appears that
Schafer has decided to take a shortcut and instead of
disputing the new meta-theory and the altered metapsychology
of the object relational and self psychology theorists, he
claims to dispense with metapsychology altogether (Schafer,
1976, 1978). Schafer does not clarify exactly what he means
by metapsychology. He does not distinguish metapsychology
from meta-theory and he decides not to analyze those changes
VTrought in metapsychology on account of the positive per-
spective impact. Instead, he cloaks himself in a professed
return to the starting point of the clinical data itself and
introduces a "new language of action for the old one of
metapsychology" (1978, p. xi) . The "new language of action"
eschews nouns and adjectives and is based on the use of
verbs and adverbs.
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Schafer's "new a-metapsychological" approach is
neither new nor without metapsychology
. There is a desper-
ation in the sweeping boldness of instituting a new language
and in the tedious detailing of its application. Schafer
marshalls his considerable skills derived from life-long
immersement in psychoanalytic theory to ward off the danger
he senses is challenging the American establishment. His
approach is old in the sense that it post-dates Gestalt
therapeutic theory by thirty years. Perls, Hefferline, and
Goodman (1951) were enunciating "techniques of awareness"
and methods of more directly "contacting the environment"
and were advocating the use of action language long before
Schafer's new ideas found print. He does not even acknow-
ledge them. Schafer's approach is not without metapsycho-
logy in the sense that he makes some of the same existential
and psychoanalytic assumptions as do the Gestalt therapists.
However, most damaging of all is the sad fact that Schafer's
approach is neither new nor without metapsychology in its
implicit, basic orientation. Behind the veneer of newness,
its fundamental essence as Freudian post-1920 structural
psychology is clearly discernible. Schafer's camouflaged
premise laying slightly behind all the new language is
Freud's famous dictum in The Ego and the Id (1923/1961) that
the conscious ego "... is first and foremost a body-ego"
(p. 27). The verbs, adverbs and nouns he still must use
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presuppose the psychoanalytic concepts of warring instincts,
of dynamic forces acting within a tripartite structure.
First principles remain and their importance is underlined
by Schafer's vehement attempt to deny them.
Assumptions and first principles can't be ignored but
much of it in psychoanalytic thought has remained at an
implicit level, perhaps because of Freud's unsystematic
approach to it (Rappaport & Gill, 1959). There are other,
just as compelling reasons for the peculiar lack of recogni-
tion of a whole set of assumptions which have, nevertheless,
been formative in guiding psychology, theory and technique.
These dimly and vaguely perceived assumptions have remained
in a shadowy realm and few have dared to challenge them.
These assumptions have remained in the "background of
thought" because they were syntonic with the needs of the
fledgling, peculiar enterprise of psychology. Psychology
needed a scientific base to gain credibility and it needed a
way of distancing from the unsettling, constant exposure to
the unconscious and to madness. Sociologically it needed to
align itself with the status quo and thus its metapsychology
itself became a "symptom" of socio-economic-political
realities of that time. This metapsychology, the unbalanced
assumptions of the negative perspective, continue to haunt
us. The abstractions of metapsychology are very real in
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their all too human derivation the^iy -.-r^dc u , rne r immanence, and their
down-to-earth consequences.
Meta-theory and metapsychology as used in this paper
require further defining. Until 1915 Freud used metapsy-
chology to mean only that which was beyond conscious appre-
hension (Rappaport & Gill, 1959, p. 153). In a footnote to
1915. Freud (1915/1957b) states that the intention of meta-
psychology
. .
is to clarify and carry deeper the theore-
tical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be
founded" (p. 222). It is the convergence of both these
general, early Freudian meanings, that which lies behind our
conscious thought and the notion of our fundamental theore-
tical assumptions, that is important for grasping the
significance of the overall permeance of the positive and
negative perspectives. This general, transcendent meaning
of metapsychology, before metapsychology took on its spe-
cialized meaning in later psychoanalytic thought as con-
sisting of six viewpoints, is synonymous with my use of
meta-theory.
Psychoanalytic metapsychology is now based on six
points of view although Freud used only three: the dynamic,
the topographic and the economic (Rappaport & Gill, 1959, p.
153). Modern clinical psychoanalytic practice holds that,
in the course of "working through," all six metapsychological
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points of view (dynamic, topographic, economic, genetic,
structural, adaptive) should be employed (Greenson, 1967, p.
21)
.
When the term meta^s^cholo^ is used in this paper
it is only referring to this later development in which
metapsychology took on a more specialized meaning.
It may be objected that the six points of view consti-
tute the total meaning of the alleged superordinate concept
of meta-theory. Isn't it true that no matter how we view
basic assumptions one or more of the recognized points of
view will more clearly, more explicitly convey the desired
meaning? The answer is that all six points of view are
themselves tainted by a transcendental point of view: the
positive and negative perspectives. This requires further
explanation.
In order to best highlight the effect which first
order, implicit assumptions have had on the overall theory
and practice of psychoanalysis and the derivative non-
analytic psychotherapies, it is necessary to avoid identifi-
cation with the tainted, metapsychological terms. For
example, the topographic point of view posits a perspective
which encompasses and speaks to the general characteristics
of the unconscious-conscious dichotomy. This point of view
might be utilized together with the motive forces of the
dynamic points of view and the aetiological factors of the
genetic point of view to explicate the phenomenon of the
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fitful appearance of the positive perspective. T^e problem
with using these points of view is that each of them con-
tains assumptions of a reductionistic
.
mechanistic, objecti-
fying nature which devalue and render meaningless the
radical positive perspective at the outset.
The lack of consciousness of those unconscious ele-
ments in the dynamic point of view, for example, is said to
be a product of the threatening instinctual nature of the
unconscious elements. These unconscious elements are either
instincts themselves or internalized representations asso-
ciated with instincts. The true unconscious make-up of
object relations, in a general sense, made up of social,
political, economic and other interactional factors, could
never get a fair hearing.
It might also be objected that the adaptational point
of view contains the essence of what is meant by the posi-
tive perspective. In a way this is so, for the adaptational
notion carries the seeds of the positive perspective.
However, it is far from identical with it. Before explain-
ing the differences, the adaptive point of view requires
definition.
The adaptive point of view is now recognized by
psychoanalytic theory as a legitimate and separate point of
view although Freud never explicitly used it (Greenson,
1967, p. 25). Hartmann and Erikson are best known for
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an
developing this point of view which they equated with
"inborn preparedness for an evolving series of average
expectable environments" (Rappaport & Gill, 1959, pp. 159-
160) .
Rappaport and Gill (1959) summarize the four basic
assumptions of the adaptive point of view as used by Freud,
Erikson (1950, 1968), Hartmann (1939/1958), Fenichel (1954)
and Spitz (1957) :
(a) There exist psychological states of adaptedness andPr°^^sses of adaption at every point of life
Cb) The processes of (autoplastic and/or alloplastic)
adaptation maintain, restore, and improve the
existing states of adaptedness and thereby ensure
survival
.
(c) Man adapts to his society--both to the physical andhuman environments which are its products
(d) Adaptation relationships are mutual: man 'and envi-
ronment adapt to each other. (pp. 159-160)
Further reference will be made to these assumptions of
the adaptational point of view in Chapter III. Although the
development of these assumptions is important for seeing
positive aspects of the symptom, as will be developed later,
it is now necessary to note the differences of this psycho-
analytic concept compared with the positive perspective.
All of these assumptions of the adaptive point of view
remain tied to a mechanistic view of man. The inherent,
positive, adaptive processes still treat man simply as the
vector summation of impersonal forces. The inner forces are
still ultimately derived from the id or from conflicting
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instincts. Even the more advanced ego psychology notion of
a conflict free ego sphere lacks the concept of an inher-
ently vital self and is overly derived from impersonal,
social forces. This criticism may especially seem unfair to
Erikson because of his attempts to "socialize" the ego and
to try to convey a more human sense of subjective reality
through his concepts of identity and the life cycle (1950,
1968). However, despite these advances in ego psychology he
remains tied to a devitalized ego. Thus, while the adaptive
viewpoint may lead to the practical consequence of allowing
the symptom to be seen in something less than a purely
negative light, the fullness of its positive vitality, its
developmental striving, its nature as a communicative,
personal extension of the self remains unappreciated.
Definition of the Symptom
S3rmptom is used in this paper in its most common-
place and ordinary of meanings. However, a good part of the
intent of this theme is to stress the uncommon view that
symptoms are not just a sign or indication of something
else. They are not just past history being repeated in the
present. They are not just an aspect of anxiety or regres-
sion or anything else. Symptoms are creative expressions of
the self and they exist in their own right. While they may
"express" the past they fully "live" in the present. In the
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psychoanalytic world the fullness of their present reality
has received insufficient attention. Behaviorism has recog-
nized and stressed the utility of taking the symptom seri-
ously, but it treats the symptom only as something bad,
something to be eradicated. Behaviorism fails to appreciate
the reality and meaningfulness of the symptom while, ironi-
cally, claiming nothing but the symptom is important. In
the end, behaviorism is no better than psychoanalysis in its
depreciation of the symptom.
Symptom encompasses both thought and physical
behavior. Its appearance is marked, first of all, by suf-
ficient deviance which at any given period of history might
attract our attention. The deviance of a symptomatic
thought or behavior is necessary but far from sufficient for
defining the symptom. Its deviant quality, in the sense of
something being wrong, beyond the ken of normality, has been
the orientation of the negative perspective. Deviance is
often implicitly extended to mean a difference that is off
the continuum of normality, a quantitative difference. This
clearly was the belief of Kraeplin (Zilboorg, 1941/1967, p.
454) and we have inherited his legacy. The implication that
symptomatic deviance indicates a quantitatively different
state of affairs is rarely sanctioned in theoretical orien-
tations today but it remains common in practice.
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A symptom is almost always a composite, a complex of
more than one thought or action. The composite nature of a
symptom makes its precise, defining boundaries difficult to
discern. In practice it is often impossible to tell where
one symptom ends and another begins. Symptoms are far less
discrete than we pretend they are. Any particular symptom
is, in fact, nothing less than a glimpse of the total per-
son. Its defining nature is ultimately inexhaustible, like
a symbol or a dream. As Sarte so eloquently says:
.
.
.man is a totality and not a collection. Conse-quently he expresses himself as a whole in even his mostinsignificant and his most superficial behavior """-i/^'^other words there is not a taste, a mannerism, or anhuman act which is not revealing. (1956, p. 568).
Symptoms express this totality and so any given symptom can
serve as a way in for understanding the client.
The complex of thought and action that make up a
symptom is characterized by a coherent and unifying scheme
to which we attribute meaning and cause. However, the
scheme utilized in the negative perspective only takes the
negative meaning into account. Symptoms become classified
into relatively exclusive categories and usually there is
more than one symptom per category. But again, the cate-
gories denote only negativity.
Sjnuptoms tend to be repeated. This repetitive nature
of a symptom is another important part of its definition,
albeit a negative one in traditional psychological circles.
34
T^is repetitive quality is sometimes associated with iner-
tia, or character armour (Reich. 1933/1945). or resistance,
transference, inertia, and the death instinct (Freud).
However, the very repetitiveness of a symptom may be seen in
another, more positive light: attempted mastery and com-
munication. This negative approach to symptomology origin-
ated in medicine. For a variety of reasons, psychology in
its infancy found the medical model a fertile ground for the
adoption of these aspects of the negative perspective.
Psychology and Medicine
Clinical psychological thought has tended to borrow
the vocabulary and assumptions of medicine at the beginning
of this century. At that time, the most essential aspect of
a symptom was its descriptive power in being able to alert a
trained observer to an underlying, pathological process. A
symptom was always a sign of something else, even though the
symptom itself might be quite serious and life threatening.
Freud and psychoanalytic theory grew out of this medical
legacy. The succession of assumptions from the pre-Freudian
medical legacy to Freud is best seen in the monumental
nosological system fathered by Kraeplin.
As Zilboorg (1941/1967) points out. Kraeplin (1855-
1936) was a systematizer and his interest was only in the
most general, descriptive qualities of those noteworthy
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behaviors seen as deviant at that time. He wasn't inter-
ested in the particular, more personal content of thought
but only in its most general form. Science would have none
of the romantic folly of getting too personal. m his
pursuit of facts he remained tied to an emphasis on abstract
categorization of external phenomena. He essentially re-
tained the physicalist base akin to the physics or chemistry
of the eighteenth century as opposed to a more contemporary
biology "which deals with the phenomena of life in a more
comprehensive and much less impersonal fashion than it might
at first appear" (Zilboorg, p. 454). One of the direct
consequences of this was the view that disease exists as a
separate entity from health and so mental illness is discon-
tinuous with normality.
Kraeplin's impersonal and detached physicalist system
might also be seen as a continuation of the medieval,
theological tenet that "all illness, including mental
illness, must be physical" (Zilboorg, p. 467). The theo-
logical fear that God's existence might be questioned if the
God substance in man, his soul, is seen as imperfect, subtly
reinforces the medical, physicalist base of the negative
perspective.
Whatever the sources, Kraeplinian thinking identified
symptoms with the separate entity of psychological disease
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and reduced psychological reality further by assuming that
behind the underlying psychological pathology was an even
more basic, physical, organic pathology. For example.
Kraeplin states:
iharactPrf^^H^f^''^^''?^^'' ""^^ ^^^^^ represents a wellC cterized form of disease, and we arp inQt^lfied xn regarding the majority at least
-oltSe clinical
l^nTlf'
^h^^h^^^ brought together here as the expres-
nf?! ^'''^^^ process, though outwardly ?hey
Freud, of course, also hoped and believed that some day a
physical pathological process (chemical) would in fact be
found as the root cause of symptoms appearing as psycho-
logical deviance (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1955, p. XXIV).
This notion of psychological symptoms being expressive
of something else, of an underlying pathology and even of a
physically based deviancy in the body's machinery, was
considered enlightened thinking (Szasz, 1961). "Progressive
scientific thinking" of the 19th and early 20th centuries
looked disdainfully at the earlier "folly" of lumping
together malingerers, criminals, and the insane (Foucault,
1961/1973; Rosen, 1968). Seeing psychological symptomology
as real (not laziness or malingering) and as organically
based as medical symptomology (not as possessed by the
devil) legitimized psychology but at a very high price
(Szasz, 1961).
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ecame
s
As psychology uncritically adopted the medical model
of symptomology, psychoanalytic thinking became burdened
with the nominal fallacy. The assumptions of Emil
Kraeplin's classification of mental illnesses in 1883 b
part of all the clinical psychology which followed. Name
were given to the unseen, inferred, underlying pathological
processes which, in parallel to the medical model, had to
exist because of the existence of symptoms. Symptoms
existed because of the existence of the underlying pathol-
ogy. These names for psychological pathology came to assume
an unquestioned reality. Because the name existed therefore
the referent must exist. These pathological ghosts lying
behind symptoms made the symptoms themselves appear only in
a negative light, an indication of insidious processes which
were all the more frightening, grave and serious, precisely
because they were unseen.
There is another major aspect to the high price psy-
chology paid in finding credibility by adopting the early
medical model's theory of symptomology. Psychology, by the
inherent nature of its subject matter, by being burdened
with a much more complex aetiological problem than medicine,
was unable to keep up with medicine's rapidly increasing
sophistication about the complexity of a symptom. Psychol-
ogy was forced into a ceaseless exploration of one elusive
causative factor after another precluding the opportunity
38
for sophisticated elaboration. Medicine, by the inherent
nature of its subject matter, had a much easier time in
finding simple, direct, physical and thus observable and
testable aetiological factors. With a basic and relatively
unchanging aetiological core medicine could afford to turn
its attention to the complex composite of pathological and
repairative processes which make up a symptom. Even though
psychology came to assume field theories of multiple causa-
tion (Rosen, 1968, p. 245), the dual nature of any given
symptom was obscured by the scant attention to any specific
determinant of that symptom. Psychological "disease enti-
ties" could not be established with reference to indetermi-
nate aetiological factors so the apparent coalescence of
symptoms was reified into a psychological disease. Once
again ghosts derived from a dubious source, however this
time the net effect was an over-simplifying of symptoms and
an over-emphasis on their most observable negative features.
During the Nineteenth century a symptom in medicine
meant little more than an observable feature of an unseen
pathological process. Medicine had a simplistic and one-
sided notion of symptoms being wholly negative and a direct
expression of the hidden illness. There was little appre-
ciation for the many unseen bodily systems which converged
into forming what an observer might detect as being note-
worthy and deviant. As the body's immunological and
defensive systems were better understood a symptom came to
be viewed as a complex phenomenon embodying the sum total
,
at any given time, of many mechanisms and forces from within
and without.
While the medical profession has become considerably
more sophisticated in its understanding of symptomology
.
psychological theory has remained fixated at a more sim-
plistic level. The evidence of our diagnostics as exem-
plified by the one sided language and content of DSM-Ill
(Spitzer, 1980) and by past and current psychoanalytic
theory is that we have failed to achieve even the psycho-
logical equivalent of the medical model's view of syniptomol-
ogy. Specifically, we have missed the notion of an heuris-
tically dynamic body which is alive with regenerative
potential. Even accepting psychological structures correla-
tive with that of medicine, ours in comparison are flat,
lifeless, overly abstract and mechanical.
It is a curious irony that psychiatry and clinical
psychology should actually be accused of fixation at a more
primitive level than medicine regarding the narrowness in
its understanding of symptoms. After all, it is said
(Zilboorg, 1941/1967, p. 488) that one of Freud's major
historical breakthroughs is his focusing on the total person
rather than on Kraeplin's nosological categories or on spe-
cific anatomical structures. And to the lajmian, psychology
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is supposed to deal with the person, with what is most alive
about us. Perhaps in its flight from suspicion of spiri-
tualism and vagueness and in its pursuit of a respectable
positivistic base, psychoanalytic clinical psychological
thought has wrung the life and autonomy from its subject
matter. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann is one of the notable
exceptions to the failure of the extended psychoanalytic
community to understand the positive, vital aspect of
physical symptoms in medicine and then see the possibility
and importance of this notion for psychological symptom-
ology:
Every general practitioner knows that many physical
symptoms are not only the expression of the patient'sdisease but also an expression of the tendency in thephysical organism toward regaining health. (1959, p. 5)
The same holds true for processes of mental illness
Its symptoms, too, both express the illness and show the
mentally disturbed person's tendency toward mentalhealth, that is, toward adjustive success in his rela-tionships with other people. (1959, p. 6).
S3nnptom as Communication
Implicit in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann
' s view of the
symptom's expression of a "tendency toward mental health" is
the S3nnptom's communicative nature. Symptoms can, of
course, readily be seen as the expression of a problem but
for those willing to make a radical change of perspective
they also express their positive meaning. The language of
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this meaning is far from discursive. Thomas Szasz (1961),
taking his cue from Freud's observations in 1895 that
hysterical symptoms could be seen as a pictorial form of
non-verbal communication (Freud, 1895/1955), calls this
language of symptoms "protolanguage . " Protolanguage is
relatively non-discursive, iconic or pictorial; it tends
to be relatively idiosyncratic, and especially has an
"... object-seeking and relationship-maintaining function
..." (Szasz, 1961, p. 299). The word "relative" is fre-
quently used because the language of symptoms is on a con-
tinuum with discursive language. It is only a matter of
degree of difference within any dimension that "crazy talk"
differs from "normal talk."
The iconic language of symptoms may be a "proto" or
simpler and inferior language when it comes to efficiency at
a purely cognitive level but in its symbolic nature it is
more vivid, terse, dynamic and complex. Sechehaye (1951a, b)
simply calls this language symbolic and sees it as having a
unique power in being as close as possible to the actual,
personal, historic coinage of the initial conflicts. The
symbolic type of expression is more directly the equivalent
of real experience, real affect, and tends to communicate
this more poignantly. It can thus serve effectively as a
conduit for empathy. The talent for psychotherapy rests on
sensitivity to this mode of relating.
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The language of psychological symptomology is a uni-
versal language which is naturally employed to both conceal
and reveal. Its indirectness, as Szasz (1961) suggests, is
part of the overall indirectness dictated by social reality.
Our needs are expressed ever more indirectly as the social
matrix becomes more sophisticated, complex, or close knit.
Too much directness causes conflict and impedes the smooth
functioning of the social group. Humor is a good example of
a mode of highly symbolic communication which, like the
symptom, utilizes indirectness to express ideas, needs and
wishes so as to minimize open conflict. Freud, in his
famous papers on humor (1905/1960, 1927/1961) held that
humor essentially has its roots in aggression and is a
relatively civilized way of expressing this aggression
utilizing a variety of disguises. The symptom, like humor,
has survival value in its indirectness and presents a
slippery facade, a caginess which resists our probing (Lukens
,
1977)
.
The concealment role of the symptomatic form of inter-
personal communication is extremely important and must be
respected by the inquiring therapist. Besides the potential
richness and primitive directness of this form of relating,
the need for this degree of concealment is a clear indica-
tion of the riskiness involved. Symptoms, as Freud repeat-
edly pointed out, are over-determined and it takes prolonged
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suffering and many small blows, perceived by that individual
as traumas, before a symptom becomes manifest. Concealment
allows a relatively safe outlet for bruised parts of the
self.
The concealment function of symptoms provides safety
against possible further loss of love, responsiveness, and
empathy while allowing the intrinsically active self to
express its hurt to itself and others. The self requires a
certain amount of responsiveness and empathy especially in
its earlier stages of development. The self is active and
expressive and cannot check its continual impingement on
external and internalized reality. The external environment
may experience this impingement and even this need for
responsiveness as threatening, as anxiety provoking for a
variety of reasons. Perhaps there is a misfit between
mother (or father) and child in terms of innate disposi-
tional factors such as activity level or the amount and
forcefulness of stimulation required for each to experience
adequate responsiveness in the other. Or perhaps, as is
more often the case, the parents experience personal im-
pingement as aggression or control or some other form of
infringement threatening to over-tax their already dimin-
ished resources. The child learns to selectively attenuate
his impingement to minimize this threat to his environment
so as to maintain the greatest possible responsiveness under
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the circumstances (externally and in the internalized
world)
.
Over time, selective attenuation of impingement, a
dissociation or false self (Winnicott) detour from normal
development, leads to clearer symptomology as the appropri-
ately successful disguises are tried out and incorporated.
Every symptom thus derives from specific failures of the
environment and bears the specific imprint of that failure.
This is part of what the symptom reveals in a negative
sense: the environmental failure and the deficit in the
self. This negative revelation is irritating to the parents
who have failed and may even serve to prompt some poten-
tially positive action, such as bringing the youth in to see
a therapist. But the aetiology of the failure is only
hinted at, concealed by its expression in another language.
Direct conflict and challenge remain hidden. The bruised
self has safely spoken.
Symptomatic language thus provides relatively safe
feedback about the pathology of parents, or even of the
extended parental environment, the pathology of some part of
society. Symptoms always occur in, and have their develop-
ment in a social matrix. They are part of a never ending
dialogue of alienation, of oppressors and the oppressed.
Those who are less powerful must conceal their message of
reproach. But they must also express it or give up their
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naturally active self, their reality altogether. John Rosen
(1968) based his radical therapy of psychotics in the 1940s
on the revolutionary doctrine that no matter how dissociated
and psychotic the patient, no matter how withdrawn and
disguised his communication, he was always communicating.
But in any age the idea of seeing meaning in the oppressed
language of symptoms is never popular. Rosen found that
"The idea of paying attention to psychotics-listening to
them and trying to understand them psychologically-seemed
to be considered ridiculous or even bizarre" (1968, p. 7).
The therapist, analyst, counsellor or teacher who
would allow him (her)
-self to see that symptoms have mean-
ing, that they communicate, and that they are the disguised
language of the oppressed has, upon that recognition, put
himself in opposition to the status quo. This is extremely
important to recognize especially for the practical applica-
tion of the theory. "Seeing" the positive, communicative,
object relational, and developmental aspect of symptomology
requires a letting down of ordinary personal boundaries and
immersement in a shared reality or dialogic experience with
another. In short, it requires the activation of empathy
without loss of self. The value of dwelling on the meta-
psychology of the positive perspective is hopefully a
freeing of one's empathic capacity with consequent freeing
of the need in those symptomatic for disguised expression of
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their reproach and of their developing real self. This
approach (as opposed to medication and obj ectification)
requires boldness and courage and the willingness to con-
front opposition. This opposition is from society in
general, from the specific setting in which one works, from
the internalized societal injunctions in those symptomatic
and in oneself, and from our individual and societal de-
fenses against awareness of the consequences of being fully
alive.
CHAPTER II
THE NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON SYMPTOMOLOGY
The Negative Perspective
(ii) certain defensive consSlIat^on^'of'thrego ^'^^
namely a combination of nonspecific manifestafiins ofego weakness and a shift toward primary-process ?Mnkfn
a
on the one hand, and specific primitive defense mecS ^anisms (splitting, primitive idealization ea?lv lormsof projection, denial, omnipotence), and on ?he othS
il^ll^ °f int4rnalized object
'
relations; and (iv) characteristic instinctual Vicis-situdes, namely, a particular pathological condensationof pregenital and genital aims under ?he overridinginfluence of pregenital aggressive needs(Kernberg, 1975, p. 44). " '
'
Delineation. The negative perspective is, first of all,
that point of view in psychology and in society overall
which sees only the negative aspects of symptomology or
psychological deviance. The negative perspective is also
that particular attitude and its consequences for the
therapeutic process which reduce the totality of the sympto-
matic person and the totality of his personal expression to
impersonal obj ectification
. The negative perspective has
been used so exclusively, so invar iantly and for so long
that we as a society, as a scientific community and as
practitioners have lost sight of the negative.
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reductionistic cast of our psychological language and
premises and especially of the effect this has on those
labeled symptomatic.
Negative in the first sense refers to almost all of
the long accepted psychological terminology which denotes
only a deficit, a loss, a more primitive stage than the rest
of us enjoy, or more usually a "diseased" or "pathological"
state. These deviant conditions (e.g., schizophrenia)
frequently imply a qualitatively different state of affairs
for those classifiable under DSM 111 (Spitzer, 1980) from
those not classifiable. That is, instead of seeing psycho-
logical deviancy on a continuum from more to less deviant,
instead of allowing that we all share the same human condi-
tion and our differences are only a matter of degree, the
negative perspective tends toward the position that madness,
no matter how slight, exists as a separate entity. This
negative view of symptomology carries the connotation of
badness, wrongness, and always is flavored by a pejorative
quality.
The pejorative quality of the negative perspective
also carries the implication of a lack of reality, of an
emptiness, of something not important in its own right.
Thus a symptom is never valued in itself but is only the
unimportant appearance of a more fundamental process or
condition. The symptom itself thus is of consequence only
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insofar as it allows an interpretation or medication to
eradicate it. The symptom thus tends to be ignored, not
listened to, and the past and future eclipse the present.
Negative further denotes dehumanization and deper-
sonalization. The essential human condition of dynamism,
vitality, developmental object related striving and coimnuni-
cation is reduced to impersonal forces driving an otherwise
inert machine. Reduced as well is the breadth of reality.
External reality becomes over-valued while internal reality
is barely considered to be real.
As mentioned in Chapter I, a large part of this sim-
plistic, one-sided view of symptomology is derived from an
unsophisticated medical model formulated before the influ-
ence of immuniological systems were recognized. Richard
Totman (1979) contends that even present day medicine has a
myopic preoccupation with a reductionistic perspective. His
analysis of psychosomatic phenomena from a medical stand-
point captures some of the defining features of the negative
perspective in psychology. He holds that there is a
medical- social orientation which operates out of our aware-
ness. This enshrouding background severely limits our
understanding of the psychosomatic component in almost all
disease. Totman starts with the explicit assumption that
"While it used to be thought that there were just a few
'pure' psychosomatic conditions, now it is generally held
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that most, if not all. diseases have a psychosomatic compo-
nent" (1979, pp. 15-16). He then essentially argues that
this seemingly obvious fact has been and remains obscured
from medical theory because "scientific thinking about
disease
.
. .
betrays a fundamentally physicalistic
, or
mechanistic, orientation to the concept of illness. It
treats the individual, the 'patient,' as a biological black
box; a complicated piece of machinery inside which events
are assumed to take place in a law-like way" (p. 29).
Totman's conclusion is that this underlying mechanistic
model of cause and effect in Western industrialized so-
cieties allows only a restricted view of health and illness.
This has profound consequences both in terms of limiting the
efficacy of treatment and in terms of the medical attitude
which regards a person seeking treatment as a "piece of
hardware" (p. 13)
.
As important as the reductionistic
,
physicalist base
is in limiting medicine's ability to comprehend and treat
illness, it is even more limiting and destructive in the
psychotherapeutic world of psychology. The negative per-
spective has lost sight of the whole person and of the
reality that S3niiptoms are an expression of the self. The
multi- faceted eloquence of s3nmptoms has been ignored in
favor of static, lifeless, unmotivated abstractions denoting
only negativity. Reality itself has been shrunk to exclude
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all that might challenge the power of the psychological
status quo. That is, the internal world with its self-
motivated, developmental striving for object relatedness.
for con^unity, is itself the locus and agent of change. To
recognize that a therapist does not make change happen, is
not the prime ingredient in change but only a facilitator of
"good enough" (Winnicott, 1958/1975, 1971) conditions,
directly challenges the therapeutic community's needs for
effectance and control.
The negative perspective, when it accurately identi-
fies and assesses a symptom, is useful in first receiving
the communication that something is wrong. Unquestionably
this is a necessary first step for everyone. This in
itself, of course, is a skill capable of much refinement
both in the formal setting of diagnostic interview or
testing as well as in everyday therapy and consulting-
activities. The literature is filled with this aspect of
hearing the symptom's communication. However, even this
first step in the diagnostic process is intrinsically linked
to the values and needs of a specific setting, of the
current psychology establishment, and to society. This has
been explicated quite thoroughly by R. D. Laing (1960, 1961,
1967), for example. This identification of symptoms, its
merits and pitfalls, is closely tied to many of the problems
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associated with the negative perspective but is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The negative perspective especially becomes destruc-
tive for the process of therapy when it becomes the only
mode of relating to the other. For the therapist, under-
standing is diminished, empathy is difficult if not impos-
sible, interpretations are unfreeing and may be experienced
as punitive, and a therapeutic alliance never gets started.
The client gets bound to the therapist in a recapitulation
of society's structure of power to powerlessness
, of oppres-
sor to oppressed. Further, the client becomes imprisoned
either to his medication or to his heightened self-
consciousness about all that is mentally wrong with him,
about his madness (Foucault, 1961/1973). He is now labeled
and shackled to the negative implications of that label.
Unless the therapist can somehow transcend the convenience
that accrues from labeling in the negative perspective the
client is left without response to the hopeful cry of the
symptom. A response to the deficit part of the symptom is
better than none at all and is the first step in that
dialogue needed for growth. But disillusionment, further
interiorization, dissociation, "acting out," passivity and
entrenchment of the symptom may occur if a positive perspec-
tive cannot be achieved long enough or consistently enough
by the therapist. When the negative perspective holds sway
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and unawares we treat the client as an object we are instru-
mental in distracting and discouraging the client from
allowing creative, developmentally motivated and object
seeking selfhood to risk change and action in the outer
world.
Psychoanalytic conrppi-s. Prior to 1920 (Beyond the PIeasure
Principle), Freud (1920/1955) frequently toyed with the
notion, derived from watching the play of his children, of
there being an innate striving for mastery and relatedness
in almost all forms of deviant phenomena. This important
development of the positive perspective will be further
elaborated in Chapter III. Suffice it to say that in 1920
Freud, in a curious piece of labored logic, did an about
face and lost his radical nerve. After over twenty years of
nurturing and teasing out the well hidden and quite subtle
positive perspective he suddenly equated one of the main-
stays of the positive perspective, the principle of repeti-
tion, with the principle of conservation and death. The
main exponent of an independent selfhood striving for
development and creatively expressing its need for a re-
sponsive environment both for normal growth and to overcome
its dissociative retreats was effectively dead. Freud
retreated to a structuralist position which brought clarity
to his work but at great cost. The psychoanalytic estab-
lishment and psychological community inherited a legacy of
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concepts crucial to an understanding of psychotherapy but
missing the critical notion of the dual nature of symptom-
ology.
R-iitance. One of the major psychoanalytic terms now
ubiquitously used in many forms of psychotherapy is resist-
ance. Resistance occupies a central position in psycho-
analytic theory and much of the psychoanalytic technique
addresses the problem of analyzing resistance. Resistance
is a large and complex concept which may be approached from
all six psychoanalytic points of view (dynamic, topographic,
economic, structural, genetic, adaptive). However, the
types of resistance are often classified by their source
within the structural point of view (id, ego. superego).
Freud first gave a detailed account of resistance in 1912
(1912/1958), then in 1914 (1914/1958), but the structural
analysis doesn't come until 1926 in Inhibitions, Symptoms
and Anxiety (1926/1959) with his final elaboration in
Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937/1964) in 1937.
In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926/1959) Freud
developed five types of resistance: repression resistance,
transference resistance, epinosic gain resistance, repeti-
tion compulsion resistance, and superego resistance. The
first three derive from defensive functions of the ego, the
fourth from the id and the fifth from the superego.
Greenson (1967) believes all five types represent defensive
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functions of the ego (conscious and unconscious) and cer-
tainly this has been the trend as seen in Fenichel (1945),
Menninger (1958), and Blanck & Blanck (1974). Regardless'
of the source or the specifics of its hypothesized mech-
anisms, mainstream psychoanalytic theory sees resistance in
negative terms as a type of defense (although Freud fre-
quently used resistance and defense synonymously). Resist-
ance tends to be seen only as something to eradicate. It
exists only to defend some aspect of the ego when it is
feeling threatened. Freud in his earlier two papers on
resistance used images of battle and warfare to describe the
analyst's task in removing resistances. Menninger 's (1958)
description of this attitudes still applies today:
In a way the analysis of each patient is a kind of
never-ending duel between the analyst and the patient's
resistance. It is no wonder that resistance almostbecomes personified for some analysts and that they tendto equate it with the disease process. Resistance is
not something that crops up occasionally to 'impede' the
course of treatment; it is omnipresent. (p. 102)
This one-sided view of resistance phenomena as bad or
as a blockage (implied by the label "Resistance") frequently
is inappropriately extended so that resistance is thought to
be directed at the analyst. In practice, it is often the
case that therapists self aggrandizingly think that they are
being opposed. Wrongly sensing they are in a battle their
own defenses become aroused. This counter- transference only
serves to widen the client- therapist gap and intensify the
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client's co^unication appearing to the therapist as resist-
ance phenomena.
The meaning of resistance, no matter of what type, is
in the best of definitions limited to those forces which
resist therapeutic change within the patient. This is often
equated with resistance to making the unconscious conscious,
a broadened version of repression acting at various levels.
But those phenomena labeled resistance in the negative
perspective are almost always seen as the opposite of a
tendency for positive change. This never helps to bring
client and therapist closer together despite a professed
interest in promoting a working alliance. When part of the
client is treated as bad, and often this is seen as a major
part, then to that extent he is demeaned, and treated as
inferior. It ' s a small step in the real world from being
seen as bad and oppositional to being labeled as willful,
uncooperative, lazy, unmotivated, and unready for therapy or
untreatable. The negative perspective in the concept of
resistance breeds this sort of devaluing and name calling
and limits the efforts of therapists to work at better
understanding the positive communication in resistance.
Resistance, while recognized as one of the key psycho-
analytic concepts, ironically means nothing more than that
which only exists by virtue of its anti-nature. It is
assigned to a shadowy and changeable realm, a temporary
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force opposing other forces. It has no vitality or sub-
stance of its own though it may be almost reified and
ossified as a sort of bodily character armor (Reich, 1933/
1945)
.
Rather than helping to alert the therapist to the
reasons that the self has adopted a temporary refuge (for
example, maintaining a sense of identity or autonomy or
mastery when threatened with its loss) or even to the fact
that the self is revealing itself as best it can, tradi-
tional resistance theory adds ever more technical labels to
the forms of resistance. The totality of the client is
missed as those operations developed over years of the
self's struggle for survival and expression are dismissed
with a quick interpretation based on the categorized form
with which the phenomena are identified. Schafer (1976),
leaving his early Freudian assumptions of drives and counter
forces, surprisingly argues that there is a real, positive
action behind the seeming negativity and anti-nature of
resistance. He calls for a more "balanced understanding"
(p. 263) which he hopes will be extended to the other major
psychoanalytic concepts as well (p. 263).
Transference
. Transference is certainly one of
Freud's essential discoveries for the understanding of human
behavior (the psychoanalytic establishment includes resist-
ance, the unconscious, and regression as the other major
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discoveries). Freud's attention was first drawn to the
concept of transference during his early work with Charcot
and then in his own experiments with and without the hypno-
tic technique (Menninger, 1958, p. 79). Freud was struck by
his repeated observation of the exaggerated authority
attributed to the hypnotist. In 1912, in his papers on
technique, especially in The Dynamics of Transference
(1912/1958), Freud was intrigued by the repetitive patterns
of his patients and thereafter thought of repetition as a
key element in transference. In 1920 ( Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, 1920/1955) Freud posited repetition to be the
origin of transference.
Anna Freud (1937) defines transference as: "all those
impulses experienced by the patient in his relation with the
analyst which are not newly created by the objective analy-
tic situation but have their source in early
. .
. object
relations and are now merely revived under the influence of
the repetition compulsion" (p. 18). Fenichel (1945) equates
transference with resistance and Menninger (1958) sees it as
an aspect of regression. All of these theories are somewhat
too narrow for it is much too arbitrary to limit transfer-
ence to therapy and it is certainly too restrictive to limit
transference to resistance or regression. Greenson (1967)
defines transference much as does Anna Freud but he gives it
a broader and more useful scope: "Transference occurs in
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analysis and outside of analysis, in neurotics, psychotics
,
and in healthy people. All human relations contain a
mixture of realistic and transference reactions" (p. 152).
Transference, unlike resistance, is carefully culti-
vated in analytic psychotherapy. Its dual nature is much
more clearly recognized although still limited because of
its place in the overall negative perspective. Freud (1912/
1958) first recognized and developed the dual nature of
transference and the repetition compulsion. Transference on
the positive side gives access to unconscious, repressed ma-
terial much as does the dream. It allows insight into early
object relations which otherwise, for the most part, are
inaccessible. The established psychoanalytic view of the
negative aspect of transference is its association with
resistance. It is felt that transference phenomena can also
be an obstacle to the work essentially by obscuring the
observing ego and replacing the working alliance.
Despite Freud's clear recognition and that of the
psychoanalytic community of the dual nature of transference,
the positive aspect of the duality is incomplete. In fact,
the recognized positive aspect is important not for itself
but for the information it provides about the past. The
communicative and object relational striving in the present,
the present hopefulness of the self for a new dialogic
experience, is missed. Missed is the chance for a genuine
60
encounter with the other. The client is still objectified,
this time into an information machine. If the right keys
are pressed, out comes the early traumas. Never is the self
given credit for its fundamental, intrinsic striving for
development and growth through its creative use of the other
in transference phenomena. The analyst/ therapist winds up
taking the credit for a fancy piece of transference
interpretation which in the final analysis is rooted in the
therapist's need to be clever, to maintain control, to
remain the healer.
The Positive Perspective
It appals me to think how much deep change I have pre-
vented or delayed in patients
. . by my personal need
to interpret. If only we can wait the patient arrives
at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and I
now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the 'sense
of having been clever. I think I interpret mainly to
let the patient know the limits of my understanding.
The principle is that it is the patient and only the
patient who has the answers. We may or may not enable
him or her to encompass what is known or become aware of
it with acceptance. (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 86-87)
Delineation
.
The positive perspective is more than the lack
of a negative perspective. It is the relatively missing
half of the full perspective needed to optimize the chance
for understanding the other and for working successfully in
a therapeutic modality. No one can fully grasp all of the
positive perspective. Its appearance always signifies an
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achievement. It doesn't come easily. it is forged in the
crucible of training, experience, and work on oneself.
After these three ingredients it takes, perhaps most of all,
courage.
Courage isn't a popular word in the psychotherapy
literature. Nevertheless, it is an apt description of that
quality required to achieve the positive perspective for
several reasons. Searles (1965, Chapters 10. 11. 13, and
15) frequently identifies the absolute requirement for
successful therapy being the ability of the therapist to
allow regression to occur. And even more, to allow oneself
to enter the regressive sphere. This puts a great strain on
anyone's sense of self and requires considerable fortitude.
The therapeutic situation in psychoanalysis, as in
projective testing, has been defined as managing the envi-
ronment so as to allow regression to occur (Menninger', 1958,
Chapter III). Freud's second fundamental rule--abstinence--
is directed toward this end (Freud, 1915/1958c, pp. 165-
166)
.
The positive perspective in psychotherapy requires
not just the technical establishment of an abstinent envi-
ronment but a venturing out into the regressive arena to
maintain the needed responsiveness of a "holding environ-
ment" (Winnicott, 1958/1975, 1971). Excuses (rationales)
are sometimes given for a commonly held position that there
is some danger in a regression. But as Winnicott asserts:
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"The danger does not lie in the regression but in the
lysfs unreadiness to meet the regression and the dependenc
which belongs to it" (1958/1975, p. 261). There is a fear
of dependence, of merging, and of sinking into a regressive
atmosphere. The extent and intensity of this fear is indi-
cated by the lack of press it receives, by the intensity of
the resistance to looking at it. Rimbaud poetically cap-
tures the terrors attendant upon loss of conscious supports
which besets anyone venturing into the uncharted paths of
creativity or of the regressive experience:
As I descended streams impassable and dark,
I felt my haulers vanished as so many ghosts
Redskins, shrieking, had used them for an arrow markNailing them, naked first, to many colored posts.
(Rimbaud, 1960, p. 5)
As mentioned previously, the negative perspective
always tends to remain dominant and in the majority as it
serves the function of a relatively successful defense
against madness. The chaos of madness is threatening at a
personal level. Glimpsing the failures of our familial-
social-economic system and the psychic consequences for the
poor of our usurption of the limited riches is threatening
at a societal level. Breaking through our personal and
societal defenses is a courageous and radical act. There is
the risk of isolation and professional censure. By defini-
tion, the positive perspective resists analysis, cloaks
itself in various disguises, must always be in a minority,
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always in the "background of thought," dim and vague. To
read the disguise and behind the disguised coimnunication of
the symptom is to be a law breaker, is to step out of the
status quo. No one can do this for long. The fifty minute
hour, like many of the trappings of psychotherapy, are for
the protection of the therapist.
So attaining the positive perspective takes courage in
struggling with regressive phenomena, in risking proximity
to madness, and in inviting isolation and censure when
breaking societal and professional mores. To allow our-
selves to see the positive perspective for awhile is akin to
removing societal and psychological blinders. Unfettered
seeing can be a radical act. It takes courage to fight off
the unease precipitated by looking over the edge of our
accustomed terrain. "Courage also slays dizziness at the
edge of abysses: and where does man not stand at the edge
of abysses? Is not seeing always-seeing abysses"
(Neitzsche, 1954, p. 269)?
Achieving the positive perspective is not equivalent
to just accepting a client nor to passively just letting
things happen. It's not "unconditional positive regard"
(Rogers, 1961). It requires a questioning of basic assump-
tions about the nature of man. One of the shortcuts to this
alternative way of seeing, a procedure that can be effected
in supervision and consulting activities to schools and half
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way houses, for example, is by stressing the value of dwell-
ing on those assumptions which make up the positive perspec-
tive.
The positive perspective assumes that man is a social
and communicative animal always expressing his innate stir-
rings for object related development. Every psychological
symptom is a complex, well fused amalgam of positive and
negative elements. Ths positive perspective, while focusing
on the positive elements, comprehends both of these. While
it radically posits a hitherto unelaborated positive striv-
ing it further asserts that the negative elements of deficit
and deviance are also communicative expressions of the self.
The negative communication has been better recognized and
well developed by Freud and others as repetition, trans-
ference and resistance, essentially as seeing the past in
the present. This basic psychoanalytic proposition, insofar
as it looks at symptomology as meaningful, is positive.
But, to the extent that it stresses the past to the exclu-
sion of the present, to the extent that it identifies the
self only with the deficit aspect of the symptom, to the
extent that it distances from engagement in dialogue with
the self in the s3miptom, it is negative.
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Psychoanalytic concepts
.
Rfli^tance. The consequences of the positive perspec-
tive are especially visible in the psychoanalytic concept of
resistance. One of Freud's great achievements which has
formed much of the bedrock of psychoanalytic technique is
Freud's discovery of resistance. Freud, and most of the
present day psychoanalytic conmunity, aim their major
weapon, interpretation, at the enemy of resistance. Freud
wrote in 1910:
iLitf^ superseded idea, and one derived fromsuperficial appearances, that the patient suffers from asort of Ignorance, and that if one removes the ILoranceby giving hm information (about the causal connl^^Ion
^i^^^^^ ^ith his life, about his experiences inchildhood, and so on) he is bound to recover The
vioP""? •"^^-'^ ''^^ ignorance in itself, butthe ro t of this ignorance in his inner resistances- it
TnH ^h^^ "^^/^^^^ ^^ll^d this igiBce into being ,a d t ey still maintain it now. The task of the triat-
225)
combating these resitances. (1910/1957, p.
The positive perspective is diametrically opposed to
this notion of resistance phenomena being "the root" of
ignorance and of the overall assumption of resistance being
located in the client. It is far from remarkable that
clients don't give up their symptoms when the true facts are
recited to them. What scientific hubris! What remarkable
insensitivity to the aetiology of their problems. What is
remarkable is the client's determined efforts to relate the
story of his bruised self and the persistance in the attempt
66
to establish a reciprocal dialogue in spite of the failure
of the therapist to understand his language.
The traditional Freudian techniques of resistance
interpretation have undergone some modification because of
the abject failure of this approach in the psychotherapy of
children, adolescents, the more psychotic adults, and those
less intellectualized. Chapter III will pursue the thread
the positive perspective has taken as these populations
demanded a different orientation. For now, it is notable
that the negative perspective on resistance is still perva-
sive and remains the major orientation being taught in
medical schools and in psychoanalytic institutes. Graduate
training programs in clinical psychology are little better
for although most have stated their objection to the ex-
tended medical model they have little with which to replace
it.
The positive perspective offers the view that resist-
ance is mainly an artifact of that encounter wherein the
health provider has failed to achieve the positive perspec-
tive. It is not a matter of a client failing to appreciate
an interpretation but of the failure of the therapist to
understand the present reality and communication of the
client. "The patient is always right." It's up to the
therapist, to the environment (Winnicott) to adequately
adapt to the client. As Winnicott puts it, ". . , it is the
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patient and only the patient who has the answers" (1971. p.
87).
Further, patience is required in dealing with the
necessary time it takes for trust to be established, for
sufficient testing to take place, and then for the natural
developmental, repairative sequence to occur. The delay in
the process of the unconscious becoming conscious is not
attributable to the inertia (a physicalist analogy) prin-
ciple, to the death instinct, to a contrary force acting
against reasonableness and our best efforts. The perceived
"delay" is rather a product of our Western industrialized
need for quick solutions and rapid progress.
Much of what is called resistance is only the in-
creased communicative efforts of a client to let us know
what the real state of affairs is with him when we persist
in supplying the answers or when we doggedly maintain dis-
tance and power. This countertransferential issue, our need
for power and effectance, along with the difficulty in
maintaining patience, are the most stubborn problem for
those learning the craft of psychotherapy. The difficulty
is rooted in the negative perspective wherein the motive
force for change is wrongly located within the therapist.
It takes getting back to some basic assumptions to re-
evaluate the change agent as the client himself. It is
difficult for fledgling therapists, or even for the most
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experienced, to first acknowledge and then sustain the
perspective that therapy is nothing more than providing a
facilitating, responsive, environment. The therapist must
work at understanding, not at trying to make change happen.
Transference. The positive perspective was perhaps
most developed by Freud in his concept of the repetition
compulsion and transference, terms he used interchangeably.
The positive value of transference as a form of communica-
tion will be developed in Chapter Til as the starting point
of the positive perspective in psychoanalytic theory.
Freud's unfortunate loss of this radical position in his
1920 paper, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1955), left
psychoanalytic theory burdened with a concept which now
carried negative connotations. As with resistance, Freud
came to associate the communicative richness of repetition
with the non-psychodynamic
,
metabiological principle of
inertia and Thanatos. Despite this negative association,
Freud maintained that transferential phenomena were of great
value (unlike resistance) in psychoanalytic therapy.
The positive perspective highlights the meaningfulness
Freud attributed to transference in revealing unconscious
aspects of the client's past. But as with resistance, the
positive perspective would do more than merely use this
communication as data to be interpreted. Transference is
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simply another astonishing, creative activity of the self.
Unquestionably it provides information. But it is also
something positive in itself. In a way. it's the adult
version of play.
Freud, and especially Melanie Klein (1932) and Anna
Freud (1964, 1974) discovered this phenomenon that the play
of a child is not meaningless, not simply a burning off of
excess energy. Rather, in play a child creatively utilizes
his environment to master past traumas and to exercise and
master his stage appropriate developmental tasks (Piaget,
1967)
.
The positive perspective sees the transferential
activity of the adolescent and adult as another form of
repairative effort. In transference the client seeks to use
the therapeutic environment in some needed way. In general,
the need is to master past object relational conflicts and,
even more, to create these environmental provisions required
for the establishment of the necessary "holding environment"
(Winicott)
.
The self uses transference to artfully shape
the therapist and his environment so as to work through
false self adaptions and re- initiate the proper development
of the self.
Empathy
.
Empathy is the major tool of the positive
perspective, as opposed to interpretation (traditional
psychoanalysis)
,
manipulation (behavior modification) , or
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the paradoxical manipulations and tag team interventions
(family therapy) now in vogue. Kohut (1977, 1978) is one of
the ground-breakers in postulating the radical notion that
introspection and empathy alone are the major psychoanalytic
tools of both research and therapy. Despite the passage of
eighty years since Freud first started using introspection
and empathy, these unique abilities remain largely devalued
within Western culture. Kohut 's efforts are directed at
establishing the validity of these tools and the consequent
and equally radical notion of the reality of the interior,
psychic world.
Addressing the assumptions of the positive perspective
can help facilitate empathy. This is done by establishing
the continuity of client-therapist and viewing the deviancy
of the client as understandable, communicative, and only
quantitatively different from ourselves. By minimizing the
distance between the two partners participating in the
dialogue of change, empathy is encouraged. The negative
perspective would merely look to theory and think of resist-
ance when it is felt that the working alliance is disinte-
grating. The positive perspective would encourage intro-
spection on the part of the therapist to look for blockages
in one's empathy. Further, since the client is always
right, working alliance difficulties should serve as an
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incentive to the therapist for increased attention to the
overall communication by the client.
Empathy can be developed not only by training and
experience but also by continued review of the positive and
negative perspective assumptions. All psychotherapy
trainees, as well as teachers and others with a need for
mental health understanding, come to their tasks with many
implicit assumptions based on the negative perspective.
Consequently, their empathy is curtailed. They often wind
up in oppositional power struggles with their charges
because of their limited empathy. Empathy is a useful,
practical concept not just in psychotherapy but throughout
the mental health field. The positive perspective can be
instrumental in allowing greater use of empathy in a variety
of settings to the benefit of everyone.
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT AND VICISSITUDES OF THE
POSITIVE PERSPECTIVE
• A^^^^^ definite trend on the part of the Iavand medical world to consider themselves as separate
^
vIrturof't£?"'°" '° """^^^^^ supe?iEr byi e of this assumed, unproven, but generally acceptedstate of being normal. Consequently, ?he so-cllledxnsane, regardless of our scientific theories are at adisadvantage m relation to the very world upon whichthey have become so dependent as a result of their
chUdren o^'T^^f°^P^^i^^ considers them step-
f.ni^l u'u t^'^ erhaps it is this psychologicalactor which has been more responsible than any otherfor the sad lot of the mentally ill throughout the agesPerhaps it is this factor, rather than thi philosophicaland theological errors of the Sprengers and theKraemers which throughout the demonological centuriesbrought down upon the mentally sick the full weight ofhuman cruelty. Perhaps this psychological factor has
survived m the human community as an atavistic butpotent inheritance from those remote days when primitivepeoples summarily killed the sick and the aged merelybecause they had become burdens to a community which
refused to be discommoded by the dead weight of theinept. (Zilboorg. 1941/1967, p. 312)
Freud
Up to now, perhaps the passage of the negative per-
spective from Freud up through the present has been over-
stressed. It is unfair to attribute to Freud the present
difficulties we have in struggling with the pervasive in-
fluence of elements of the negative perspective. Freud's
great stature as the most influential psychological theorist
can hardly be held against him. Like all of us, he is
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partly the product of all the historical forces of his t:
That aspects of the negative perspective, which by defini-
tion tend to oppose conscious thought, found their way into
his theorizing is not unusual. What is remarkable is the
extent to which he made these unconscious elements conscious
and the extent to which he achieved the positive perspec-
tive.
Although elements of the positive perspective on
psychological theory were in evidence long before Freud, it
took Freud's genius and courage to begin to assemble them in
a coherent point of view. As I have discussed, there is
great difficulty today in "seeing" psychological symptom-
ology from a more positive perspective. Freud's accomplish-
ments are all the more remarkable given that his positive
perspective achievements began eighty-six years ago and were
carried out almost single handedly against great resistance
from his medical profession and from society in general. In
pursuing the meaning of all human thought and behavior, in
trying to understand man in his totality, Freud greatly
extended the meaning and scope of symptomology
. Prior to
Freud, S3nnptoms had mainly been viewed only as a sign of an
underlying pathology, as something to eradicate. Freud
amplified the notion of symptoms from discrete, tell-tale
signs of pathology into the more continuous revelation of
the person's life history. It is this very broad notion of
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symptomology, not the specific symptoms o£ a diagnosti
category, that will be pursued. The interaction of Freud'
bold new attitude toward symptomology with his radical
method of listening rapidly led to meta-theoretical break-
throughs. With Freud, the positive perspective took a
quantum leap forward until Freud lost much of his radical
nerve
Among Freud's significant positive perspective
achievements, perhaps the greatest was the degree to which
he took "normal man" out of his separate, ego-centric place
in the world. To this extent, Freud is on a par with
Copernicus and Darwin. It is not just that Freud challenged
mankind's haughtiness in his exclusive identification with
rationality and his denial of a bestial unconscious, al-
though this would certainly in itself testify to his courage
and radical insight. Even more, Freud defied the sacrosanct
elevation and separation of one man from another, of the
"normal" man from the "madman," of asymptomatic man from
symptomatic man. As Foucault (1954/1976, 1961/1973) so beau-
tifully elucidates, it has been considered "progress" that
madmen have gradually been separated in houses of confine-
ment and in our thinking from society in general as well as
from criminals, malingerers, and debtors. Freud had the
audacity to oppose this "progress" by theoretically putting
madness and symptomology back into antisepticised society.
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This achievement by Freud is especially noteworthy as
he also had to question the elevated position and separate-
ness of the doctor, of society's representative in keeping
madness at bay. Through daily introspection Freud labored
on lessening his personal separation from madness; through
therapeutic activity (first hypnotism and suggestion with
Charcot and then free association coupled with empathy) he,
for the first time in western psychological history
(Zilboorg, 1941/1967), cut through the scientific-medical-
professional detachment from madness. This was a first for
the psychological use of directed therapeutic effort serving
as a research Ti^sthod as well and a first for putting all
normality on a continuum with madness. All the rest of
Freud's positive perspective achievements derive from this.
The positive perspective in Freud thus began with his
earliest psychoanalytic work, On the Psychical Mechanism of
Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication (Breuer 6c
Freud, 1893/1955) . Here Freud broke with the medical
tradition and looked for the meaning and causality of
hysterical symptomology not in the physical world (Charcot)
,
not in the mere forms of the ideational world (Kraeplin)
,
but in the specific content of the mental world. Eschewing
three of Charcot's four descriptive, physicalist phases of
hysteria (the epileptoid phase, the phase of large move-
ments, the phase of terminal delirium), Freud says: "Our
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attempted explanation (of hysteria) takes its start from the
third of these phases, that of the 'attitudes passion-
nelles'" (p. 14). This is the hallucinatory phase. Freud
continues
:
^ well-marked form, it exhibitsthe hallucinatory reproduction of a memory which was ofimportance m bringing about the onset of hysteria--the
memory either of a single major trauma (which we find£ar excellence in what is called traumatic hysteria) or
a series of interconnected part-traumas (such as under-lie common hysteria). Or. lastly, the attack may revivethe events which have become emphasized owing to their
coinciding with a moment of special disposition totrauma (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1955, pp. 13-14)
Freud was taking the internal world and its symptoma-
tic expression seriously. He was also understanding that
this world had meaning (his determinacy assumption) and even
more, that the apparent madness of hallucination "repro-
duced," communicated memories of real past events (traumas).
The qualitative gap between madness and sanity was closing
and the special sort of seeing-listening this demanded
contained the seeds of empathy. Further, Freud was using a
therapeutic technique ("the cathartic method" in hypnosis)
not just for therapy but as a tool for advancing theoretical
understanding
.
Two years later, in 1895, Freud opened the doors to a
fuller development of the positive perspective by modifying
his technique. In The Psychotherapy of Hysteria (1895/1955)
Freud had broken with Breuer and established the technique
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of free association. Advances in technique, like Descartes'
construction of calculus, not only solve old problems but
open new worlds. Freud was no longer manipulating or acting
on his patients with a technique reminiscent of the opera-
tion of a machine. No longer was hypnosis "being applied."
The need for effectance and control persisted in his inter-
pretative technique but now he was just listening. Symptoms
weren't just isolated phenomena to be eradicated but were
coming to be seen as an irreducible part of the person's
life history as narrated in free association. This techn-
ique could be applied to everyone, as well as to oneself.
Empathy and introspection were becoming the therapeutic and
research tools of the trade, though it took fifty years for
them to be fully appreciated in Winnicott and Kohut
.
Freud had begun to take the whole person into consi-
deration by attentively listening to the story of his'
patient's life and to the contextual meaning of his symptoms
In 1900 Freud (1900/1953) added dreams to the significant
activity of man and in 1905 (1905/1960) he added humor.
Dreams and humor, like the symptoms of hysteria, were mean-
ingful. Pathological conditions and the seemingly trivial
activity of dreams, jokes, and even a child's play could
communicate to him who valued the meaningfulness and present
reality of another. The symptomatic expression of the self
could take many forms
.
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The significance of repetition symptomology
, of the
repetition compulsion, was perhaps first observed in Breuer
6c Freud's work, Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Conn.nn.--
cation (1893/1955). Freud there spoke of
.
. the hallu-
cinatory reproduction of a memory.
. . (p. 14), Xn
dreams. Freud then saw repetition symptomology in the dream
work's replaying events of the past with the implication of
an inner striving for mastery (1900/1953), a suggestion he
then picked up in children's play and in the exercise of
joking (1905/1960). However Freud soon was taken with the
importance of resistance and repetition came to assume a
mostly negative nature.
Repetition became mainly that activity which will be
endlessly reproduced in acts if it is not abreacted and
brought into awareness (1914/1958) . At this stage trans-
ference is also seen in a more negative light, a source of
resistance (1912/1958). The positive perspective is in
danger of eclipse as Freud's narcissism blinds him to seeing
that "the patient is always right," blinds him to seeing the
positive meaning of symptomology. Images of warfare pre-
dominate in his work at this time for Freud wants to assert
the correctness of his interpretations while the patient
demands acceptance of his own way of testing and developing.
Typically Freud says, "He (the therapist) is prepared for a
perpetual struggle . . ." (1914/1958, p. 153).
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Aspects of both the positive and negative perspectives
on symptomology and on the therapist's attitude and methods
are interwoven in Freud's ambivalence at this time. On the
relatively positive side Freud says, for example, ".
. .we
must treat his illness, not as an event of the past, but as
a present-day force" (1914/1958, p. 151), and "we admit it
(repetition compulsion) into the transference as a play-
ground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete
freedom. ..." (p. 154). On the negative side Freud says,
completing the last quote, "... and in which it is ex-
pected to display to us everything in the \<ray of pathogenic
instincts that is hidden in the patient's mind" (p. 154).
Freud continually warns of the dangers in repetition, both
to the patient and to therapy. In the balance, Freud is
leaning towards the negative perspective with clear emphasis
on fighting resistance as opposed to "seeing" and aligning
with the positive forces for change within the patient's
s3nnptomatic communication through repetition and trans-
ference.
One year later, in 1915, Freud dramatically regains
some of that perspective on the total person he lost while
embattled with resistance phenomena. Repetition symptomol-
ogy can once again be seen in a more balanced way with its
positive aspects recognized as an important ally in the
process of therapeutic change. The inherent striving of the
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self toward object related health even in the most "patho-
logical" conditions gets its clearest expression in all of
Freudian thought. In The Unconscious (1915/1957d)
, in his
attempted explanation of the remarkable existence of dream-
like "word-presentations" in the waking thought of schizo-
phrenics, Freud asserts:
It turns out that the cathexis of the word-presentation
IS not part of the act of repression, but represents thetirst of the attempts at recovery or cure which so
conspicuously dominate the clinical picture of schizo-phrenia. These endeavors are directed toward reeainine
the lost object
. . . (pp. 203-204)
Freud picks up this same theme in A Metapsychological
Supplement to the Theory of Dreams (1915/1957b) and extends
it to include even the most bizarre "word-presentations" in
the schizophrenic's hallucinatory symptomology
:
The hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia has been
thoroughly studied; it seems as a rule to be of a
composite nature, but in its essence it might well
correspond to a fresh attempt at restitution, designed
to restore a libidinal cathexis to the ideas of obiects
(p. 230).
At this point, Freud's individual achievement of the posi-
tive perspective is remarkable. He has brought almost all
aspects of human activity and symptomology (dreams, play,
psychotic thought and hallucinations, neurotic compulsions
to repeat, especially as seen in the transference, and the
mechanisms of regression, projection, condensation, dis-
placement) into a cohesive, positive perspective. There is
no form of human thought or behavior which can be considered
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foreign or separate or qualitatively different. Even
the very symptomatic expression of "pathology" or deviancy
can now, quite astonishingly, be seen as having in its
content an understandable striving towards "cure" or
"health."
An ominous shadow falls on all this positive develop-
ment in, fittingly, A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to
the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the DisP.p...P (1915/1957a)
.
While still strongly acknowledging the importance and
reality of the inherent psychical tendency towards "cure,"
as expressed in symptomology
, Freud's attention is captured
by C. G. Jung's notion of inertia.
'^}}^^^^acts throw light on a statement by C. G. June tothe effect that a peculiar 'psychical inertia,' which
opposes change and progress, is the fundamental precon-ditionof neurosis. This inertia is indeed most pecu-liar; It is not a general one, but is highly special-ized; it is not even all-powerful within its own field,but fights against tendencies towards progress and
recovery which remain active even after the formation of
neurotic symptoms. (1915/1957a, p. 272)
Up to now, Freud had come to see the dual nature of
repetition compulsion symptomology as expressive of both an
indication of pathology as well as a striving for "progress
and recovery." But now, as in 1914 when resistance was
viewed as opposition situated within the patient, the
negative denotations of repetition gain the ascendency.
Freud had a brief flirtation with an object relational base
for the positive, repetitive principle in The Unconscious
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(1915/1957d) but now he finally consolidates all psychical
symptomology in an instinctual base.
In The 'Uncanny' (1919/1955) instinct has clearly
replaced the object seeking nature of the self, repetition
has only a negative character and takes on a strange, eerie,
threatening quality:
For it is possible to recognize the dominance in the
unconscious mmd of a 'compulsion to repeat' proceedingfrom the instinctual impulses and probably inherent inthe very nature of the instincts--a compulsion powerful
enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to
certain aspects of the mind their daemonic character
and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of
'
small children; a compulsion, too, which is responsible
for a part of the course taken by the analyses of
neurotic patients. All these considerations prepare us
for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner
^compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny. (p.
Freud had come the closest to articulating and achiev-
ing the positive perspective in The Unconscious (1957d) in
1915. It appears he was quickly losing his radical nerve,
his courage was failing, and he was retreating to ever more
abstractionistic
, devitalized principles. The final blow
for some of the most essential, comprehensive aspects of the
positive perspective came the following year.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1955) Freud
attempted to systematize some of his basic metaphysical
assumptions (not his metapsychological points of view) . The
adequacy of the derivative Reality Principle to oppose the
all powerful, instinctual core of the Pleasure Principle had
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been questioned for years. Freud needed an equally strong
and self-energized force to achieve a reasonable balance.
He found the answer in the repetition compulsion. Freud's
logic becomes awkward and forced as his need for a rigid
dualistic scheme of opposing forces thrusts the repetition
compulsion and the Pleasure Principle into unnatural oppo-
sition.
Freud first loosely associates psychical repetition
with the meta-biological notion of ontogony recapitulating
phylogony. Even the principle of the stability in genetic
inheritance from one generation to another is linked to the
principle of repetition. The logic becomes more abstract
and stilted as Freud associates the repetition compulsion
with a fundamental property of stasis and conservation in
the physical and psychological worlds. The next step is to
the Death Instinct, a force capable of opposing the activity
and life of the Pleasure Principle.
There is irony in the metamorphosis of a principle
which once was afforded the elevated, positive status of
expressing man's inherent, unceasing, object relational
striving towards mastery, "progress" and health, as ex-
pressed in concrete symptomology into an abstract principle
of inertia and death. Resistance phenomena, regression,
transference, dreams, play, and all symptomology were now
tarred with the brush of negativity. As Freud himself says:
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in:t>ts'oi s^ff-pre^er^^t^Sr^Sf importance . of the
Ihl^^ I
whose function it is to assure that the organism
?han tin ^
^^turning to inorganic existence othert hose which are inmiinent in the organism itselfWe have no longer to reckon with the organism's puzziinsdetermination (so hard to fit into any context) ^^^^^'-'^S
maintain its own existence in the face of every ob-
stacle. (1920/1955, p. 39) ^
After 1920 Freud does try to pick up the more human
part of us. He places our selfhood in the ego and super
ego, especially in the super ego. But these are lifeless
constructs, mechanical, secondary and derivative without
substance or energy in themselves. Instincts remain at the
heart of us, Eros and Thanatos, impersonally and perpetually
at war. Much of the psychoanalytic and clinical psychologi-
cal establishment, along with lay society in general,
remains caught, mostly unawares, in the resultant negative
perspective. Symptoms can only be seen in a negative light.
This resultant negative perspective on symptomology has
significant and long lasting consequences for the theory of
change and for the psychotherapeutic process.
Once Freud removed the vitality, the communicative
striving and the impetus in all repetition symptomology
toward restoration and health, the patient/client was left
with no inner motivation for cure. Once change had been
attributed to the natural tendency in the client to grow and
develop, now the power for change can only be firmly located
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in the therapist. It is now up to the therapist to make
change happen, to intervene and manipulate and interpret.
When resistance phenomena occur it is only the fault of the
patient, of his basic inertia or Death Instinct. The
therapist is off the hook.
Freud had the courage and perseverence to articulate
more of the positive perspective than anyone previously. He
left a mixed legacy, but there were others to cultivate the
seeds he first planted.
Post-Freudians
Early Schizmatics--C
.
G. Jung and W. Reich
. C. G. Jung and
W. Reich were important spokesmen for some selected aspects
of the positive perspective. However, both were relative
deadends in the overall development of the positive per-
spective. Neither had a major impact on the established
theory or practice of psychotherapy. Jung and Reich have
always retained an intense and cult- like following, but
their ardent supporters have remained in the minority. As
theorists accepted by the establishment came to give voice
to more of the positive perspective, and with the impact of
Eastern culture and religions, these early Schizmatics have
found greater acceptance.
C. G . Jung . It is well known that Jung broke with
Freud partly on account of Jung's feeling that Freud
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over-stressed man's sexual and secular nature and so despite
his professed intent wound up treating symptoms in their
superficial meaning rather than taking the whole person into
account. Jung brought man's spiritual and religious nature
into the therapy room. Jung, by virtue of his extensive
work with psychotics, and given his adoption of Freud's
positive perspective notion of the meaningfulness of all
human thought, tried to find the meaning of psychotic
thinking. Jung found associations between the highly
symbolic (Freudian "word presentations") mode of religious
expression in primitive and modem culture with the verbal
and artistic productions (symptomology) of psychotics. Thus
Jung, like Freud, put psychotic thinking (but also religous
symbology) on a continuum with "normal thought" and helped
close the gap separating creativity from madness from sanity
from spiritual experience.
In his notions of archetypes and the collective
unconscious, Jung came to a sort of teleological thinking.
To E. Kant's a priori categories of understanding he added
a kind of inherited memory with his concept of the collec-
tive unconscious. The collective unconscious is made up of
archetypes which Jung defines as "unconscious regulators"
(1960, p. 204). These unconscious regulators of "psychic
energy" ".
. .
can be healing or destructive, but never
indifferent
. .
." (1960, p. 205). Jung thus hypothesized
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that there was a potentially healing force in all of us if
one's psychic energy could be property channelled. The
consequences for therapy were that the patient himself had
the answers to his problems, the curative agent was in the
patient, not the therapist, and the motive force for change
came directly from the patient's unconscious. Patients'
dreams, artistic productions, and free associations all had
a positive, communicative nature.
W,_Reich. Wilhelm Reich's major break with Freud came
in 1920 after Freud's publication of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (1920/1955). Reich felt that Freud had shied away
from Freud's original theoretical basis for all psychologi-
cal phenomena: sexual energy. Like Jung, Reich focused on
the formative influence of the libido. But Reich would have
none of Jung's (or Freud's) abstractness
. Jung and Freud
and the rest of the psychoanalytic community were essen-
tially accused of being too fearful of sex and aggression,
of "acting out" counter-transferential material. "At issue
was the concrete releasing of aggression and sexuality in
the patient. At issue was the personal structure of the
therapist who had to deal with and handle this aggression
and sexuality" (1942/1973, p. 121).
Reich's goal was to bring "man the animal" back into
therapy. In this regard he also emphasized the positive
perspective notion of accepting and engaging the whole
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person. He emphasized that after 1920 "form eclipsed
content ..." (1942/197'^ n i9q\ ukJ-^^z/iy/j, p. 125). He especially felt that
the theory of the death instinct represented "... signs of
disintegration within the psychoanalytic movement
. .
."
(1942/1973, p. 125). Further,
The exponents of the death instinct, who appeared ingreater and greater numbers and with increasing digSitybecause now they could speak of 'Thantos' instLd of
^'
^""^^^^ neurotic self-injurious intend ofthe sick psychic organism to a primary biologicalinstinct of the living substance. Psychoanalysis neverrecovered from this. (1942/1973, p. 128)
Reich wanted to bring the psychoanalytic patient back
to life. He tried to restore the "rightness" of the pa-
tient's communication by stressing the unpopular issue of
countertransference. He asserted that the so called "nega-
tive therapeutic reaction" was the therapist's fault, not
the fault of the patient's Thanatos. Therapists are afraid
not only of sex and aggression, but also of "pleasure anxi-
ety." As for ego psychology, he said, "The atmosphere was
becoming 'purified'" (1942/1973, p. 124). However, Reich's
theory itself became purified and abstract as he
went from sex to universal orgone energy and he also re-
mained rooted in a physicalist, non psychodynamic orientation
Early object relations and play therapy
. Melanie Klein,
Anna Freud and Heinz Hartmann stand out as significant
contributors to the positive perspective. Anna Freud and
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:e m
a new
Melanie Klein, in particular, have been a seminal fore,
the development of the positive perspective. Jung had to
modify psychoanalytic technique and learn the language of
symbols and artistic creating because of his work with
population, with the symptomology of psychotics. S. Freud
had modified his hypnotic technique to work with those who
couldn't easily be hypnotized and so opened up an entirely
new view of man. Anna Freud and Melanie Klein also had the
courage to extend psychoanalytic therapy to an entirely new
population, to children. (Freud tried once, failed, and
decided that unless the father were the therapist it would
be impossible to enlist the support of the child in any of
the psychoanalytic procedure, especially in following the
basic rule--uncensored free association)
.
Melanie Klein
.
Melanie Klein was the intrepid innova-
tor who first started the psychoanalytic therapy of children
in 1919. She devised a new technique, play therapy, and
followed and interpreted the free associations of children
as acted out in play. Klein understood that children com-
municate S3m[ibolically in play. Her technique allowed her to
work with children as young as two years old and even with
them she utilized direct interpretation. Klein believed it
was important to establish direct contact with the patient's
unconscious anxiety and fantasy (Segal, 1967). She believed
in by-passing the more cautious and circuitous route
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established by Freud of interpreting defenses and resist-
ance. In a way. this was a positive perspective technique
in that she hoped to engage the deepest and "realesf parts
of the self. However, these interpretations were made with
little regard for the history of the defenses, were forced
on patients, and implied that the curative power of therapy
was situated in the interpretative ability of the therapist.
Melanie Klein pushed back the frontiers of theory to
the months of earliest infancy. Perhaps her greatest
contribution, besides the play therapy technique which
allowed communication with children, was her development of
the very early stirrings of object relations. "I have often
expressed the view that object-relations exist from the
begining of life
.
. (1975, p. 2). Klein's theory of
very early development was based on the mechanisms of
introjection and projection. Her thoughts on the two stages
of the oral period, the paranoid-persecutory-schizoid and
the depressive position were tied to an object relational
vocabulary of whole objects (a person) or part objects
(e.g., a breast). This had great influence on the rest of
British School theory, especially Fairbaim, Winnicott, and
Guntrip.
As great as these contributions were to a positive
perspective, object relational, self psychology, Klein's
thinking was imbued with much of the negative perspective.
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While she used an object relational vocabulary and took the
reality of the internal world very seriously, she tended to
ignore the social and familial forces of the external world.
Further, it was always very clear that behind the object
relational, descriptive forms of the oral stage the real
energic system was instinctual, not object relational:
I hold that anxiety arises from the operation of thedeath instinct within the organism, is felt as fear ofannihilation (death) and takes the form of fear of
?f i^"^; ^^^^ destructive impulse seemsto attach Itself at once to an object-or rather it isexperienced as the fear of an uncontrollable overpower-ing object. (Klein, 1975, p. 4) t^i^powe
Anna Freud. In 1926 Anna Freud modified Klein's play
therapy. Anna Freud brought a new respect for the child to
psychoanalytic theory and technique. Although perhaps best
known for her elucidation of defenses which she developed in
her work with children (they apply to adults just as well),
it was her humanizing of the play therapeutic relationship
which gives her a lasting place in the positive perspective.
Anna Freud eschewed direct and forced interpretations
and stressed respecting the defenses of the child and the
need to elicit trust and to build a working relationship.
She maintained that the child was a person and contact had
to be made with the quizzical, timorous self, not with
unconscious anxiety. Unfortunately Anna Freud used a
desicate, lifeless, structural ego psychology theory. But
this didn't obscure her sensitivity to the person of the
92
child. Further, she was much more attuned ^n ^t,i^i-ti uE to the external
reality of children, to their plight as V1V^•j-ign victims of insiduous
social and familial forcpc, . • ,i t ces, as seen m her collaboration in
Beyond the Best Interes^. of the Child (r^iA . •~ ^d£__Ln un i (Goldstein, Freud &
Solnit, 1973).
^^^^^^-^-I^I^^ In Chapter 1. the relation-
ship of the adaptive viewpoint in psychoanalytic metapsy-
chology with the implications of adaptive processes in the
positive perspective was briefly discussed. It was said
that adaptation has relatively little to do with the posi-
tive perspective on symptomology
,
although there are simi-
larities. The extent of overlap depends on how broadly we
define the metapsychological concept of adaptation. Cer-
tainly the psychoanalytic concept of adaptation mainly devel
oped by Erikson (1950, 1968) and Hartmann (1939/1958) has
been helpful in advancing the positive perspective. The po-
sition of this thesis is that the positive perspective is a
super-ordinate meta-theoretical assumption. The six metapsy
chological viewpoints partake to a greater or lesser degree
in the assumptions of the positive and negative perspectives
Greenson (1967) states the adaptive point of view
comprehends "all propositions concerning the relationship to
the environment (of) objects of love and hate, relations to
society, etc." (p. 25). This definition excludes nothing.
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Rappaport and Gill (1959) give a much fuller, detailed,
bounded account. As a general statement it can safely be
said that the adaptation viewpoint is based on biological
principles first and only secondarily are these related to
psychosocial processes. Even when we are out of the realm
of biology altogether the psychosocial processes are based
on biological and physicalist analogies and metaphors. The
adaptive viewpoint never achieves a purely psychodynamic
.
object relational core. Never is the communicative aspect
of symptomology or the striving for more than adaptation,
for mastery and "curative" development, ever broached.
This general critique of the psychoanalytic metapsy-
cho logical adaptive viewpoint applies to Hartmann's use of
adaptation as well. However, in Ego Psychology and the
Problem of Adaptation (1939/1958) Hartmann makes explicit,
and develops much more fully, Freud's implicit notions of
adaptation which have some import for the positive perspec-
tive. Hartmann's argument begins with the hypothesis that
".
. .
certain forms of conflict solution (defenses) may
involve biological guarantees of an adaptation process to
external reality" (1939/1958, p. 14). Hartmann then extends
those adaptive processes to fantasy which ".
.
.in contrast
to dream work
. . attempts to solve problems in waking
life" (p. 18) . Adaptive processes may effect changes to the
external environment (alloplastic) , or to the internal
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environment (autoplastic)
,
or may even proceed by changing
environments
.
Although Hartmann remains tied to a biologically based
ego psychology, he has been able to look favorably at his
fellow humans. Basically he attributes a positive meaning
to their actions, even to fantasies. He posits a self-
motivated, self-energized force or structure within all of
us. No matter what our label within DSM-III
, we all share
the same impetus towards getting along with and mastering
the inner and outer worlds.
Later object relations and self psychology
. The work of
Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip, British school, object
relations therapists and theorists, had a common development
They were contemporaries and although each was an indepen-
dent and innovative thinker their theories grew out of one
major, psychoanalytic branch. This was the positive per-
spective, object relational sequence started with Freud and
greatly amplified by Melanie Klein., Klein had legitimized
the object relational wafflings in Freud by rooting her
theory in an object relational view of the neonate's mental
structuring. This represented a major challenge to Freud's
other base, the biological, and constituted "the real turn-
ing point in psychoanalytical theory and therapy within the
Freudian movement itself" (Guntrip, 1971, p. 47).
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Klein provided credibility to the realness of the
internal world, Sullivan provided acceptance for the use of
the term "self" with his "self-system" and "self
-dynamism"
(Sullivan, 1953, 1974), Balint (1968) began the notion of
the formative significance of an early, object relational,
"basic fault" (Balint. 1968), and Fairbaim synthesized all
of this.
Fairbaim. Winnicott, Guntrip
. Fairbaim was the
first to truly achieve and maintain the view that object
relations were the crucial, determining factor in the out-
come of the personality. Even Guntrip. a theoretical rival
of sorts, concedes this (Guntrip. 1971. p. 101). Adding the
refinements and the special areas of development which
Winnicott and Guntrip pursued, there was now, for the first
time, at least in some isolated spots in the British Isles,
a psychology of the person.
Fairbaim himself states that ".
. it would appear as
if the point had now been reached at which, in the interests
of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be
transformed into a theory of development based essentially
upon object-relationships " (1952, p. 31). Man isn't just a
chunk of floatsam pushed this way and that by dark, inter-
ior, animal forces. Rather, both the formative influence of
the external social world of man and the reality of the
internal social world of man is recognized, a radically
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major event. Fairbaim also recognizes the positive aspects
of regressive and other seexningly pathological sympto.ology
and puts this in an object relational context.
D. W. Winnicott, while far less of a systematizer than
Fairbairn, allowed his in^nersion in daily pediatric practice
with children to inform and concretize the more speculative
and abstract theory of Fairbairn. All of the positive
perspective pioneers utilized the radical human tool of
empathy, but Winnicott achieved the ability to utilize it
best of all. Winnicott 's writings demonstrate his closeness
to, and dialogue with the psychic reality of another.
Winnicott created the major concepts of "the holding
environment," of the "facilitating environment," and of
"good enough mothering." These concepts, together with his
consistent compositional attempts to convey the social
reality of the inner world, give him a unique place in the
achievement of the positive perspective. In addition,
Winnicott extended and personalized Balint's notion of the
basic fault in what Winnicott called the false self. Kahn
pithily summarizes the false self concept of Winnicott:
"The false self has as its main concern a search for condi-
tions which will make it possible for the true self to come
into its own" (1969, p. 393).
Winnicott 's additions to the positive perspective,
such as the concept of hope in the anti-social tendency, of
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creativity, and his notions of nlav ^ a -ur pi y, are found m almost
every page of his writings. All of this is of great practi-
cal significance for the practice of mental health delivery
(Friedman, 1975). To read Winnicott is to risk having one's
attitude permanently changed. This applies both in a theore-
tical reorientation to a new empathic understanding of man's
striving to do the best he can in a difficult world as well
as to an altered perspective on our professional therapeutic
efforts
:
•
•
psychotherapy is done in the overlap of the two
^^^^f-^?f^^^''^L ^'"^ patient and that^f t^^TT^^-
,
If the therapist cannot play, then he is not
suitable for the work. If the patient cannot play thensomething needs to be done to enable the patient tobecome able to play, after which therapy may begin The
reason why playing is essential is that it is in playingthat the patient is being creative (1971, p. 54).
Winicott continues
:
It is in playing and only in playing that the individual
child or adult is able to be creative and to use the
whole personality, and it is only in being creative that
the individual discovers the self. (1971, p. 54)
.
Harry Guntrip helped to bring Winnicott 's and
Fairbairn's work out of Britain, popularize it, sxjmmarize
it, and put it in historical perspective. Guntrip made
increasing use of Winnicott 's work after a period of analy-
sis with him (Sutherland, 1980, p. 849). Guntrip especially
emphasized the positive nature of his extended view of
defense, including splits in the self, the use of manic-
depressive states, and the defensive use of object relations
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in the internal world. Guntrip's work has served as a
valuable link to Kohut
.
Heinz Kohut
.
Winnicott had the ability to sustain empathic
immersion in shared psychic reality. However, his use of
this achievement remained at an implicit level. Heinz Kohut
openly acknowledged the importance of these remarkable
positive perspective abilities in man. Western man's stress
on external reality, on a positivistic and physicalist
obsession with external facts, has made the internal world
generally thought of as unreal. Freud and the rest of the
positive perspective theorists have had the courage to
challenge this unbalanced perspective but the scientific
community remains skeptical.
Heinz Kohut (1978) has brought the issue to a head in
openly declaring not just the utility, but the necessity in
using introspection and empathy as the basic tools of
psychotherapy. Kohut has explicated the concepts, systema-
tized them within his self psychology theory, and has used
his elevated status within the Chicago psychoanalytic
community to legitimize them. Kohut has helped to further
the positive perspective's legitimization of the technique
giving access to the internal world, of our ability to
achieve this technique, and of the internal world. Kohut
writes
:
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fantasies faSnot seen 'sm^illd'^'h:' ^^^^^"g^'They have no existence nhvi^ i touched,
are real, and we cin observe^?he^\'P?£^' ^"'^ ^^^^
Kohut, as legitimizer, has helped establish the
reality in America of the notion of the self (1977) . This
has marked the end of the exclusive domain of the ego in
American psychological thought. Freud's retreat in the
1920s to the structuralist position has finally been
challenged in this country. With it, Kohut brings a new
personalness and vitality especially with his stress on the
value of psychic energy, of psychoeconomics as opposed to
inert structure. American psychology now has the rudiments
of a discipline equal to that of medicine.
CHAPTER IV
PRAXIS
setting by being good enough in the matterof adaption to need, is gradually perclived by thepatient as something that raises a hope that the trueself may at last be able to take the ?isks involved ?nstarting to experience living. (Winnicott, 1956 p.
It is not without reason that most of the major,
positive perspective developments have all proceeded from
work with children or with the more psychotic end of the
continuum of mental health. Freud first developed his
notions of the striving for mastery significance of the
repetition compulsion and of play in his observation of
children. He saw the "curative," "restorative" function of
regression, fantasy, and hallucinations in his therapy with
schizophrenics, as did Carl Jung and Wilhelm Reich, llelanie
Klein extended object relational theory and Anna Freud
humanized technique in their work with children. Fairbairn,
Winnicott and Guntrip solidified object relational theory
out of their experiences with the schizoid and seemingly
more psychotic phenomena. Winnicott also was guided by his
daily contact with children and their mothers in his exten-
sive pediatric practice.
It seems that children and those with more psychotic
symptomology are most acutely sensitive to the personal
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infringement and intrusiveness of negative perspective
interventions. They have taught these major theorists the
most about the human condition by their refusal to be
reduced to non-personal mechanisms. In the unsocialized
directness and insistent, unsettling communication of their
symptomology, they force us to look more deeply at ourselves
and at the consequences of the world we have constructed.
Children and psychotics have especially taught us
about our mistaken notion of change in the psychotherapeutic
process. Western industrialized man is especially fond of
his ability to manipulate the environment. Psychology has
not been immune to man's hubris in his ingenious capacity to
effect change. But children and psychotics have been
especially resistant to allowing psychotherapists to change
them. New techniques have had to be developed to allow
successful work with these populations in particular. Most
of all, psychotherapists have been forced to either question
their notion of change or to declare these resistant,
symptomatic people untreatable. Psychotics and children
have instructed those who could listen that it is unavailing
to attempt forceful manipulation. Even more, they have
demanded that therapists give up the comforting notion that
they make changes happen. Rather, the impetus for change is
situated within the client himself and is communicated in
the symptom's reaching out for a dialogic encounter. All
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the therapist r^st do. and this is a very difficult "all" to
achieve, is symbolically adapt to the client's psychological
needs
.
I feel that children and psychotics have been most
instrumental in "instructing" me in the significance and
practical applicability of the positive perspective. My
academic background had been in literature, especially
poetry, and philosophy when I accepted a position as a live-
in head of a residential house for psychotics. I wanted to
sound the reality of my interest in psychology originally
sparked by the power for literary critique of Jungian
analytic theory. A year long immersion in daily living with
adolescent and adult psychotics, under the guidance of Dr=
John Rosen, convinced me that these residents were communi-
cating. The communication, however, was in a form more
reminiscent of highly symbolic, nondiscursive poetry than
ordinary, linear conversation. In living together we were
all forced to reach some understanding of one another,
if only for the accomplishment of daily household tasks.
This very intense year at Twin Silos left me with the
conviction that the actions and words of psychotics had
meaning, no matter how seemingly bizarre or crazy. I was
especially struck by the psychotics' use of humor, of irony,
to cautiously make contact, test my capacity to understand,
and yet still remain safely at a distance. I was frequently
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vexed and impatient with this indirectness. I wanted to
exercise a greater degree of control and immediate effect-
ance both for the carrying out of daily chores and for .
"making" these patients "get better." Since they were crazy
I felt I had to be the one to do something to make change
happen. But whenever I became "pushy," direct and intru-
sive, no matter how good my intentions or how important the
task, my efforts were resisted. This challenged my needs
for power and effectance.
I also met with very frustrating resistance whenever 1
responded in literal ways to their symbolic language. I
felt I had to get them to speak and act more "normally,"
like the relatively asymptomatic world. It was too diffi-
cult to stay with symbology. I felt it was my job to
mitigate this indirectness. My attempts at getting them to
talk more discursively were always resisted. I had to learn
to give
.
.a bit of symbolic bread and a spoonful of
symbolic tea
. .
." (Sechehaye, 1951b, p. 138).
Seriousness was another major issue. I felt entirely
justified in trying to promote greater seriousness and more
discursive communication. Symbology and the seemingly
unserious, play-like quality the residents demanded in our
relating was OK for fun and for poetry, but not for the
"real" world or the serious task of getting them un-crazy.
Whenever I waxed self-righteous as the representative of
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sanity and became too serious, too directive, unwilling to
play, the residents would get angry and give up communi-
cating for awhile. I am a product of the ethic in the
western industrialized world that work is virtuous and needs
to be separated from play (Russell. 1935/1960). Winicott '
s
notion of therapy as a form of play (1971, pp. 40. 57), and
of therapy as not doing (1958/1975, Chapter XXI), is very
difficult to achieve.
After my year at Twin Silos, I concentrated on the
therapy of the more psychotic population, with somewhat less
emphasis on play therapy with children, in my graduate and
residency clinical work. Reading, and the fortuitous super-
vision with Frank Summers, Ph.D., at our Sustaining Care
satellite of The Psychiatric Institute of Northwestern
University Medical School, allowed me to grasp the overall
historical significance of my developing orientation and to
further conceptualize and label two important concepts. The
first is the necessity for the therapist to adapt to the
needs of the client (Winnicott)
. The second concept is the
reality of the client's true self and its inherent striving
for object related maturation. The locus for the impetus of
change lies not in the therapist but in the client. The
arena for therapy is in the dialogic space between client
and therapist.
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From my experience, I began to more clearly see a
fundamental divide in the clinical attitude and therapeutic
approach to clients derived from implicit assumptions in
society, in our profession, and internalized as needs within
ourselves. I have come to label this divide simply the
positive and negative perspectives. The positive perspec-
tive is always an achievement, both to recognize and to
implement. In our culture the negative perspective always
tends to dominate and is always associated with power and
the status quo. The positive perspective is thus always
radical, it takes courage to achieve it, and it can only be
sustained for short periods of time through the radical
techniques of empathy and introspection.
With this dichotomy in mind, I was able to see the
possibility of a unified orientation which could inform all
aspects of our existing techniques and theory. It has been
a rewarding challenge to attempt to apply this orientation
in the field to the three clinical roles I try to "play":
therapist, supervisor, and consultant. I will give a brief
sketch of some of the promise and the difficulties in my
efforts to apply the positive perspective orientation.
Therapy
Therapy has been my basic research laboratory, medium,
and teacher. It has been the setting where I have tried out
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techniques in accord with the positive perspective, it
has afforded an endless supply of material, and the unceas-
ing feedback from my clients has been my major source of
confirmation and criticism. Since the preceding chapters
have been about therapy, I „iu u^it this section to high-
lighting important positive perspective consequences for
therapy and my struggles with them. In addition, I will
provide one example, drawn from the literature, to exemplify
these themes.
The positive perspective facilitates therapy with all
client populations: children through the aged and the
acutely psychotic through those with the mildest of adjust-
ment disorders. The positive perspective is not a new
theory but only a complement to existing theories. I feel
it fits best with a basically psychoanalytic, object rela-
tional, self psychology base. That has been the orientation
I have grown into. By "psychoanalytic" I don't mean psycho-
analysis itself but, rather, a psychoanalytic orientation in
psychotherapy. This essentially boils down to a belief in
the determinacy of the unconscious, a recognition of the
symbolic nature of thought and behavior even if the client
isn't trying to follow the first cardinal principle of
psychoanalysis, and a setting where transferential and
regressive phenomena are emphasized.
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The most important consequence of the positive per-
spective is the altered attitude of the therapist. Learning
to do therapy is, most of all, a matter of achieving the
proper attitude. All the technique and theory in the world
is useless unless one can adopt a very special orientation
toward the client, the therapeutic situation, and oneself.
The positive perspective, by situating the motive
force for change within the client, helps create that
attitude needed for a successful working alliance and helps
one correct counter-transferential intrusions. The client
is always trying to actively communicate and find that
"facilitating environment" he needs. It is only necessary
for the therapist to provide a "good enough holding environ-
ment." The client, after a period of testing, will work
with and use the therapist (and continue to test) to give up
false self adaptions and allow his true self to emerge. The
positive perspective helps encourage this process by promot-
ing greater warmth toward the client and appreciation of his
creativity--his unique way of expressing his problem and of
trying to solve it.
I have found that I have a tendency in therapy to want
to do too much, to make things happen, to force change, to
over- interpret
.
Winnicott's notion of working towards not
interpreting is especially useful for me to keep in mind. I
over- interpret and become anxious mainly when the flow of
108
material slows and 1 sense distancing by the client. The
positive perspective philosophy helps me at the times to
supervise myself. Rather than looking to the client when
resistance phenomena appear, I am nnach quicker to look to
gaps in the quality of my empathy. Invariably my own
impatience, my need for control and effectance, has altered
my attitude toward the client. With internalized positive
perspective supervision, I am able to discern when my inter-
pretations become premature and when they have the quality
of forcing the client to see something about himself so he
can get better faster. When therapy goes awry, the positive
perspective reminds me that the agent promoting change is
the client and that my job is to get back to the very
difficult task of looking and understanding.
My favorite negative perspective way to exercise
control and effectance is by allowing my ideas, my know-
ledge, to become my main focus. I may over- interpret or I
may just pull into myself and lose contact with the client.
Some alternation between empathic merging and discursive
hypothesizing is necessary, but it's all too easy for me,
and for most therapists I know, to value one's own clever-
ness above the creativity of the client. As Winicott nicely
puts it:
My description amounts to a plea to every therapist to
allow for the patient's capacity to play, that is, to be
creative in the analytic work. The patient's creativity
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much the therapist Ws iJ:^ '^a^'^^I' ^^^^^^^ how
knowledge, or Refrain IrA.^^fr^'^^^ ^^^^ this
(1971, p. 57) advertising what he knows.
I am far from having achieved the positive perspective
and, by definition, it is always an ongoing struggle to
catch it. It can never just become a part of one. It is
never more than momentary achievement and it is only in
doing, in the struggle, that it can be approximated. But
the ideas, the philosophy, can serve as something to hold on
to in the unstructured potentiality of therapy. Like
anything else, reliance on this crutch can become a disrup-
tive defense, and sometimes it does. But for the most part,
it serves me as a reliable supervisor and a self-correcting
defense.
The disguise, the most visible aspect of the symptom,
can be thought of as a form of test for the therapist. It
is necessary for a client to establish a feeling of trust
for the therapist. The symptom's disguise can be a way of
testing to see if the therapist can be trusted enough not to
be fooled. This theme of testing is presently being devel-
oped by Joseph Weiss (1971). Unfortunately, he is casting
this valuable notion in ego psychology terms. In self
psychology language, the client wants to know if the thera-
pist can distinguish true from false self manifestations.
Will the therapist be like everyone else and fail to look
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for the vital, real self? Does the therapist have the
courage and enough real self to tell one from the other? To
not be content with compromise adaptions at the expense of
the self?
The positive perspective cannot be maintained for
long. All of us need our sessions to be well bounded in
time, say fifty minutes, and our overall time of direct
client contact to be limited. But even then we are often
deaf to the communication of our clients. The quality of
our empathy waxes and wanes. We are human. Too much chaos
and even the hardiest among us feel the need for organiza-
tion. We will make mistakes. It's amazing how much blind-
ness and stupidity on our part the client's self will
tolerate. As long as we can occasionally have the positive
perspective remind us that there is a real, communicating
person whose environment failed him we can even make use of
these failures. Recognizing that we have failed, realizing
the importance of this, and revealing it at the proper time
is a positive perspective achievement.
One of my biggest struggles in applying the positive
perspective was, and continues to be, difficulty in being
clear about the way to express acceptance of the client's
reality. I've talked of how I've tended to become too
active out of my need for effectance. I've also been too
active out of my need to show acceptance of the client by
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working hard "with" him. Sometimes I've attempted to show
my acceptance of the client's inherent creativity by being
too passive. Establishing the proper space between the
client and myself and finding my proper role in the dialogue
is always difficult. It's very hard work. There is no
simple formula. The positive perspective is helpful when I
lose the way in telling me to look again at the client. He
has the answers.
The following is an example of an abridged dialogue in
therapy illustrative of several of these themes. It is
drawn from Blanck & Blanck's Ego Psychology and is meant "To
illustrate how the interpretation is made from the surface
down to increasingly deeper levels ..." (1974, p. 320).
Blanck & Blanck capture an aspect of the positive perspec-
tive theme that Miss Keller's utterances have meaning, that
they are attempting to symbolically communicate, and espe-
cially that to properly understand the communication it is
necessary to situate it in a developmental context. How-
ever, because of their near-sighted preoccupation with their
theory, they lose sight of their client and the negative
perspective dominates. Blanck & Blanck purport to illus-
trate their theme by opposing their own more enlightened,
modern, earlier developmental approach to the traditional
psychoanalytic approach of interpreting at the tri-partite.
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oedipal level. Miss Keller has been in therapy for two
years and the therapist is a woman.
Miss Keller: Today I feel that I should see a derma-tologist about my skin.
Therapist: You think constantly about your appearancebecause you are not sure that your body isalways as it should be. ^
The therapist interprets too quickly. She never
really finds out what Miss Keller is trying to say. The
therapist is distant, preoccupied with her own preconcep-
tions of the meaning of the material. The therapist is
intrusive in the client's process and seems to feel that she
must do something, must make a clever interpretation, must
break through the client's indirectness to make changes
happen. Further, the therapist interprets away from the
object related component of this communication and misses
the interpersonal message to the therapist.
Miss Keller: Sometimes I think I look better than at
other times. (Passive compliance with the
therapist)
Therapist: You are not always certain that your body
is the same.
Miss Keller: I did not know much about my body when I
was a child.
Therapist: Where was your curiosity?
Blanck & Blanck claim that "This comment is both to
encourage curiosity and also to elicit historical material"
(p. 320) . They also see it only in terms of providing
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genetic material: in this ca^P t-T.^+- ^-ui-ni se, that there was no masturba-
tion and therefore their hypothesis is correct that the
phallic stage was never adequately attained. The positive
perspective doesn't deny the importance of understanding
communication in the context of a developmental perspective,
far from it. The problem for this therapist is that this il
her only focus and it seems to serve as an intellectualized
defense against becoming involved in the broader, interper-
sonal communication. The therapist is evincing a demeaning,
know-it-all attitude and continues to usurp her power and
stay in charge.
Miss Keller: I always feel there is something wrong.(She's not just talking about her body!)
Therapist: Do you think you noticed your mother's
body changing when she was pregnant?
Miss Keller: Well, I must have but I don't remember
that.
Blanck & Blanck say that "Repression is operative"
(p. 321). However, the therapist blindly barrels along with
her enlightened Ego Psychology theory and is producing more
material than the client.
Therapist: But you often worry about gaining weight.
(The therapist is relentless. She clearly
feels she knows better than the client.)
Miss Kell QIC: I had a dream 1st night. I was going on
a trip abroad. You were the tour direc-
tor. You divided us up into two groups --
experienced travelers and novices. You
put all the men in the superior group.
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Blanck & Blanck say: "A dream, presented following an
intervention, confirms that the intervention is correct in
content and timing" (p. 321). They go on to say again that
their interpretive level is correct in being pre-phallic and
that the patient's poor body image is a result of feeling
damaged because of her lack of a penis when she compared
herself to her brother. Further, "The therapist, here,
wants to lead to the condensation in the primary process of
the observation of the mother's enlarged, pregnant body with
the brother's and possibly father's penis" (p. 321).
Rather than disputing the accuracy of these professed
aetiological links, I think it is more fruitful only to ob-
serve that the theoretical and meta- theoretical assumptions
of Blanck & Blanck and the therapist are obscuring their
ability to see and to listen. Their attitude has been
affected by the physicalistic nature of their orientaHion
.
They are heavy-handedly applying their theory the way a
mechanic might apply grease to a wheel bearing. The poor
client is relatively inert while they drive home one inter-
pretation after another so as to give the client the benefit
of their enlightened insights. It is the very nature of
their theory, its implicit immanent quality that restricts
their vision and makes empathy difficult.
The last communication by Miss Keller, the dream, is
as clear a statement as one might V7ish of the method and
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attitude of the therapist and the effect that this has had
on her. Whatever her genetic experiences are that make her
feel inferior to men, they are being reinforced, recapitu-
lated, by the dominant and superior attitude of the thera-
pist. It's amazing that Blanck & Blanck can only see the
telling of the dream as a present, a confirmation of their
approach. Dreams, like any other material, may be used by
the self to communicate any kind of meaning. To rigidly see
the presentation of a dream as always a gift is to have an
overly simplistic view of communication. Ironically, the
very communication used by Blanck & Blanck to prove the
rightness of their interventions clearly indicts their
theory and its application as promoting misalliance with the
client. The dream is only taken as a superficial sign of
something else, a present. In the end, this communication
isn't taken seriously. The interpersonal meaning of the
content is ignored and the form of the communication, a
retreat to dream narration the better to directly disclose
her feelings about therapy, is missed.
Supervision
Although I derived the elements of the positive
perspective from therapeutic experience, supervision and
consultation have required that I clearly explicate and
S3nithesize these elements. My major focus in conveying the
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positive perspective orientation in supervision is in
getting the supervisee to question his implicit assumptions
about therapy and the notion of change. At times this
becomes didactic, and then no doubt I'm least effective.
But this seemingly abstract, philosophical discussion about
the premises of therapy has been surprisingly helpful to
both new and experienced therapists.
This approach has been most successful when the
personality of the supervisee allowed me to ground his
difficulty in achieving the positive perspective in his
counter- transferential issues. Every impediment to using
the positive perspective can always be traced to
internalized aspects of society's negative perspective.
They operate out of the supervisee's awareness and he will
always resist giving them up. He will often experience them
as deep needs of his own.
I have found that alternating between philosophy and
counter-transference kept supervision from becoming too much
like therapy. The stress on theory provided the supervisee
with an articulated perspective he could take with him into
the therapy room. Without emphasizing theory, the super-
visee comes to attribute too much power to the supervisor
and is never afforded the security of knowing how his
material will be reviewed.
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I have found it important to model the positive
perspective with the supervisee. The same benefits the
positive perspective confers on the therapeutic relationship
apply to the supervisory relationship. Of special signifi-
cance is the opportunity for the supervisee to truly let his
real self emerge and risk failure. To the extent that he
remains armored in false self roles adopted to comply with
his image of a "real" therapist he makes little progress in
learning the craft and is guaranteed failure with his
client. Adopting the proper attitude is one of the most
difficult of the positive perspective achievements. The
hovering attention, the personal warmth, maintaining the
space required for play, all are much better demonstrated
than described. Or better yet, the theory coupled with the
experience provides both substance and structure enabling
assimilation of the experience.
Another way to look at the supervisor's exemplifying
what he wishes to convey is parallel process. Unquestion-
ably this phenomenon is of great significance. Too often I
have seen supervisors doing other than they say with their
supervisees. The results are always destructive for ther-
apy. Treating the supervisee as a person rather than a word
processer pays great dividends. It is vitally important to
be sensitive to the inner reality of the supervisee, his
sensitivities and his needs. Without this, the supervisee
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will either stay too distant and be unable to expend the
effort it takes to appreciate the inner reality of his
client or else he will rebel and get too close and enmeshed
with the client.
The ability to merely see resistance phenomena rather
than react to them is difficult to learn. And even more, to
truly believe that the client is always right and to look to
yourself for the therapeutic failure, your failure to
adequately adapt and understand, takes considerable theore-
tic repetition and great confidence in the support of the
supervisor. Again, it's important for the supervisor to
model this interaction as well. Few supervisors can main-
tain the perspective that the supervisee is always doing the
best he can and that the motive force for change within
supervision must be attributed to the supervisee. Confi-
dence in his growth if given sufficient empathic under-
standing is the sine qua non for facilitating the super-
visee's achievement of the positive perspective.
Perhaps the main obstacle to successful therapy for
the beginning therapist is his need to feel he is doing
something. Therapeutic space creates great anxiety in
fledgling therapists. They always seem to need to fill it.
They are impatient for change and will exhaust themselves
forcing it to happen. Of course, this only results in power
struggles. Clients will fight back when they sense they're
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being objectified, when there is intrusion into their
personal reality. It is important to flush this issue out
early and to reinforce the positive perspective view with
much repetition. Powerless neophyte therapists will tend to
assume what power they can in session with their clients and
are loathe to give up the power.
The positive perspective view on diagnosis and the
meaning of symptomology is of great value in helping the
therapist alter his perspective. In traditional diagnostic
labeling the deck is stacked against seeing the continuity
of normality with madness. The negative perspective assump-
tions easily lead to a sense of separateness from, and
superiority to, those with noticeable symptoms. This is, of
course, out of the awareness of the supervisee and he will
vehemently object that he doesn't at all think of himself as
superior if the subject is broached in these terms. Never-
theless, as Zilboorg (1941/1967) points out, this attitude
of superiority runs deep and has been with us for centuries
.
The positive perspective philosophy, when directed toward
diagnosis and symptoms, allows recognition of this fact
without directly confronting the supervisee with a challenge
to his self image.
Langs' (1979) recent book. The Supervisory Experience ,
contains some of the most advanced psychodynamic thinking on
supervision. Like many of his publications, however, the
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text is taken from Langs "s oral r»oresponses in a question and
answer format. Consequently the book lacks a coherent
sustained and detailed explication of his position His
overall orientation does come through and the content of his
answers illustrates many of the do<5i>-j,.o ^y Ln p s tive perspective themes
and techniques for achieving them in supervision.
One of Langs 's major techniques in helping the super-
visee gain a therapeutic way of seeing is by stressing
theory, especially the context of the therapeutic encounter.
"I would offer the supervisee a rather detailed discussion
of the function of the frame: its importance in creating a
symbolic field and therapeutic regression
.
.
" (p • 131).
Langs also continually stresses the significance of counter-
transference as evoked by the client, by the setting of
therapy, and by the supervisory relationship. Even more,
Langs focuses on the meaning of the communication between
client and therapist and emphasizes the importance to the
supervisee of understanding that "the therapist's interven-
tions are the immediate adaptive context for the patient's
subsequent associations" (p. 122). Langs even stresses the
importance of empathy for both therapist and supervisor.
However, Langs misses an important ingredient that I
have found most useful in effectively conveying these
themes. In terms of empathy, for example, Langs only refers
to it in terms of its "validating" nature (p. 323), a kind
121
of supervisory check on the therapist's narration of
therapy. Nowhere does Langs stress one of the most essen-
tial aspects of supervision: the modeling of empathic
understanding with the supervisee. Langs frequently warns
of the dangers of intellectualization by both supervisor and
supervisee and yet his mode of relating to the supervisees
is as distant and intellectualized as one can imagine.
Langs does not do as he advises.
Consultation
I have tried to find ways to implement the positive
perspective philosophy in schools and a halfway house. I
believe in not supplying direct service to the students and
residents of these settings. My orientation is to work with
the teachers, parents, and counselors. I try to facilitate
their work, help empower them to work more cooperatively and
to utilize their own resources more effectively. I believe
consultation means working yourself out of a job.
My consultation technique is similar to my methods in
supervision. In these consultation settings, my "teaching"
and my attempts to exemplify the positive perspective have
met with more success than I anticipated.
The teachers, parents, and counselors with whom I work
are psychologically naive. The basic problem for the
consultant with this relatively untrained population is how
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can one possibly Inculcate therapeutic skills in an extreme-
ly limited period of time. These skills normally take years
of training, study and supervision to acquire. What differ-
ence can a consultant possibly make in what often appears to
be an impossible task?
I have found that a consultant can make a great deal
of difference by using the same shortcut method utilized in
supervision. Instead of focusing on one incident or even
one type of situation with parents, teachers, and coun-
selors, it is much more efficient in the long run to use the
presenting incident as a way to discuss the philosophy of
change in a broader context with that person or institution.
For the consultant to understand that the most obvious form
of the presenting symptom is less important than the total
contextual message of the symptom is to approximate achieve-
ment of the positive perspective.
This may at first seem like the long way around to
both consultant and consultee. The consultant wants to
prove himself, demonstrate his cleverness, his understand-
ing, and his ability to make something happen. The person
or organization seeking help is looking for the answers, and
perhaps especially looking for the consultant to provide the
service directly. As with Freud's second cardinal rule of
psychoanalysis, maintaining abstinence, the consultant must
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abstain from directly responding to these explicit or
implicit requests or to the insistence of his own needs.
It is tempting to encourage dependency in those to
whom we consult and to establish a sinecure for ourselves in
the process. It is difficult to put off the imagined, but
no less insistent, need in ourselves and others for answers,
control and effectance. To the extent that I have been able
to ward off these pressures and get the help seekers to look
to first principles and to themselves, the results have been
quick in forthcoming.
Perhaps this process can be analogized to the notion
in psychotherapy of the client's internalization of the
therapist. In this case, the consultees internalize not the
consultant but an orientation. The orientation of the
positive perspective is best gleaned from being in the
presence of a consultant exemplifying this orientation and
from encouragement in looking at basic assumptions. This
requires more explanation.
Looking at basic assumptions with teachers, parents,
and counselors is similar to doing it with supervisees.
Consultees have less initial theory than those we supervise
so the transition to pure philosophical theory requires an
extra emphasis on making this theory concrete. However, the
problems and benefits that accrue from this basically
didactic approach are the same as in supervision. This
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direct "teaching" of theory has been well accepted by all
the populations to whom I consult. But this sort of
teaching, even when well grounded in the consultee's experi-
ence, isn't enough. It is necessary to couple this with the
best teacher of all, exemplification.
When I say that it is necessary for a consultant to
exemplify the positive perspective I mean several things.
The example must be set in the relationship itself with
parents, teachers, and counselors. There is a dialogue in
the consultative relationship in which the consultee is
seeking to have his self and his striving for mastery
recognized, appreciated, and engaged. The consultant can
further exemplify the positive perspective by the material
he selects. He needs to show that within the seemingly
negative situation both the ultimate recipient (the student
or child or resident) and the consultee are trying to
communicate and establish hopefulness. Also, the consultant
exemplifies by his way of talking about the material. His
timing, his attunedness to the receptivity of the consultee,
his non-pejorative language, his lack of implying a superior
attitude, his unwillingness to join the consultee in indulg-
ing the temptation for finding power in their alliance, all
of this is essential.
The workings of exemplification are something of a
mystery. I have discussed modeling and parallel process in
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the supervisory process. Another important component is
permission. Everyone seems to know at heart that the
positive perspective is desirable. However, it is enor-
mously difficult to achieve and to maintain. It has the
quality of a taboo. It must always remain radical and
seemingly risky to acknowledge. When a consultant, a
representative of "sanity" and of a legitimized therapeutic
technique, exemplifies the positive perspective, the inter-
nalized societal censors are temporarily neutralized. The
negativity is transmogrified and where once there was only
deficit and negativity, now there is communication, striv-
ing, and hope. What was obvious becomes possible, at least
until the censors return.
One of the consultative settings in which I introduced
the positive perspective was a half-way house for discharge
patients from a state mental institution. These residents
of the half-way house were all a more chronic population and
all came from relatively financially poor families. None of
the half-way house staff had training or experience in
mental health and all tended to come from middle to upper
middle class families. The staff was liberal, young,
humanistically oriented, and looking for meaningful work.
They were all underpaid. Politically, it has been expedient
and good public relations for the state bureaucracy to dump
the most difficult and S3niiptomatic population on those least
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trained to understand or care for them. It's cheap, the
state saves money (or thinks it will), and the politicians
wave the humanistic banner of "the least restrictive envi-
ronment" in front of their applauding constituency. How-
ever, in this case, the very youth of the staff, their lack
of training, their idealism and desire to find meaning where
others avoided it, allowed them to be receptive to an
alternative way of looking at these ex-patients and the
system that had institutionalized them.
I was offered a consulting job on the only basis the
half-way house could afford: two hours per week. Besides
myself, there was no other training, supervision, or clini-
cal guidance afforded. Given this extreme time limitation
and the magnitude of the work to be done I felt that the
most effective orientation I could take was to concentrate
almost wholly upon the staff, its attitude, clinical exper-
tise, and ability to use their own resources. No specific
case material will be presented as my focus in the consulta-
tion always remained on the general, systemic application of
the positive perspective.
When I arrived, my first impression was that these
dedicated, well intentioned, hard working counsellors were
serving as cannon fodder for the political war machine.
They were overwhelmed with their task and had no guiding
orientation. Burnout was threatening, morale was low, and
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everyone jumped from crisis to crisis. If the positive
perspective could be put to a test anywhere, this was surely
it (although the school systems were no better)
. The
negative perspective was here fully reified. The reality of
madness: its suffering, its deep-rooted nature, its per-
sistence, all were denied by this token gesture of the stat
of Massachusetts. No one had considered real improvement
a serious goal as there was no serious funding. I was
concerned that my role was only intended to appease the
workers, the staff, to let them vent their frustration, and
that any other approach was foreclosed by design (uncon-
scious) of the bureaucrats.
During the first several weeks of my consultation the
staff entertained magical expectations. They wanted me to
personally solve the unending crises and give them hard-
nosed advice and procedures so they could better manage the
crazy residents. I resisted the temptation to play an
expedient god and tried to work towards the long term goal
of understanding, of a radical change of attitude, and of
better use of their own resources. I occasionally did
intervene and become more directive when it seemed a "real"
crisis threatened, or when I was persuaded that one did.
Even in these cases, however, I found that I had made a
mistake and that the crisis could easily have been handled
just as well if I had stuck to my self-avov/ed approach.
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We met in group sessions and either singly or as a
team they would present the problems they were having with a
particular resident. Little by little they began to get
away from this crisis model and started to trust their
ability, especially as a team, to confront the challenging
problems. I focused on their basic assumptions about the
residents. These always came down to attributions made
about the most visible and superficial aspects of their
symptoms: they were unmotivated, lazy, non-communicative,
resistant, provocative, nonsensical, non-serious, and they
stubbornly seemed to want things their own way. It was
extremely difficult for the staff to see that there might be
a symbolic, interpersonal meaning in the apparent symptom-
ology. Even more, the staff implied that I must be soft-
headed or just plain wrong to think that the residents had a
striving for mastery and cure and that it was up to the
staff to understand the form this took and adapt to it . I
advocated allowing and encouraging the residents to come
together more often and to feel freer in their use of the
half-way house environment. Out of their need for separa-
tion from madness, the staff had unconsciously communicated
to the residents that they should stay to themselves and to
their own rooms.
At heart, it seemed that the staff had an unspoken
fear of madness and loss of control. This issue was
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manifested in thPiT- i r,.^K-: t •m eir mabxixty to empower the residents to
use .ore of the half-way house on their own ter.s The
counsellors felt they were above reproach in their great
sacrifice of ti.e and effort in organizing activities for
the residents. Letting go of some of their organizational
control was very difficult. But most difficult of all was
letting go of the control they maintained in interpersonal
encounters. The staff always tended to approach the resi-
dents with their own preconceived agendas based on their
class values and on the criteria by which the bureaucrats
would judge them: maintaining a job, keeping their apart-
ments clean, managing money appropriately, and interacting
with
-normal" social skills. These encounters always turned
into power struggles, with the residents communicating that
they weren't being heard in ever more dramatic ways and with"
the staff hiding their anger behind greater distance and
self-righteous insistence on their middle class values.
I have now been working at the half-way house for over
two years and I feel great progress has been made. All the
"regular staff" has stayed. There is a much greater sense
of professionalism and pride in their work. The half-way
house, despite its clinical and bureaucratic dependence, is
enjoying an atmosphere of self-reliance. The staff is much
more aware of the political and clinical realities and are
coming to appreciate the radical nature of their enterprise
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and the level of their clinical insight. The worlc they
must do is rarely facilitated by the rest of the
de-institutionalizing system. More often, the nonchalance
and the demeaning attitude (to say nothing of the ineptness)
taken by the legions of psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers and bureaucrats makes their work even more diffi-
cult. None of the staff can individually maintain the
positive perspective for very long in the face of all this
outer and inner pressure. We have addressed this problem by
spending considerable time working on the staff structure so
as to promote closeness and cooperative reinforcement of
this radical perspective. We have faced up to the task of
clarifying the implicit power structure within the half-way
house and in this respect and in others I have had to prove
my lack of collusion with the bureaucrats, with the leader-
ship of the half-way house, and with their own defenses. I
have most often failed with the last of these challenges,
with the collusive pull of their defenses.
The staff is now using their own resources for peer
supervision. They are presenting case material with much
greater depth, with attention to the interpersonal signifi-
cance of the symptomatic behavior, and with far less of a
crisis orientation. In some respects they have moved away
from the anti-psychiatric, humanistic orientation of two
years ago. This was exemplified by an outward show of
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disdain for structure or money, an unwillingness to look at
power issues, and a generally suspicious and resentful
attitude toward clinical work. And yet, as they have bee
more structured, as they have come to take madness more
seriously, they have been enabled to truly achieve a radical
perspective.
Given the initial cons traits of this consultation, my
original goal of working towards staff adoption of the
positive perspective has proven feasible. It's unclear to
what extent the residents have benefited from this approach
as there were no experimental controls. To the extent that
the staff is more understanding of the residents, that the
residents are interacting more and using more of their
environment, the positive perspective has been useful.
Further confirmation is their readiness to soon let go of
their consultant.
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